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ABSTRACT—Questions of whether prosecutors should be immune from 
liability for constitutional torts, and if so, whether that immunity should be 
qualified or absolute, have been the source of considerable controversy for 
the last half century. Some argue that absolute prosecutorial immunity is 
indispensable, a necessary tool to protect public servants who, without 
immunity, would be buried under a mountain of frivolous § 1983 suits. 
Others see absolute prosecutorial immunity as unjust because it prevents 
genuinely wronged individuals from rightfully collecting damages from 
constitutional tortfeasors. As the debate over the Supreme Court’s 
prosecutorial immunity jurisprudence continues, the current scope of 
protections afforded to prosecutors outside of the judicially created 
immunity regimes has received decidedly less attention. This Note will 
argue that states and local municipalities have created a number of 
protections for public officials, including prosecutors—such as 
indemnification legislation, private insurance, and other alternative liability 
mechanisms—to cover losses from torts they commit in the line of duty. 
These protections prevent prosecutors from shouldering the burden of 
personal financial liability even in instances in which they cannot don the 
cloak of absolute immunity. Considering the breadth of the protections that 
are currently afforded prosecutors coupled with the opportunity for their 
expansion to additional jurisdictions, the Court’s decades-old justifications 
for maintaining absolute prosecutorial immunity are no longer a concern. 
Therefore, the Court should abandon its confusing absolute prosecutorial 
immunity jurisprudence once and for all. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Several high-profile cases have recently thrust the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct into the collective American consciousness. The 
botched prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens for failure to disclose gifts and 
the “rush to accuse” three former Duke University lacrosse players of rape 
both generated significant media attention.1 They are prominent examples 
of the fallout that can result when prosecutors abuse their position. Though 
the charges against both Senator Stevens and the Duke lacrosse players 
were eventually dropped,2 many other less publicized incidents have 
featured frivolous litigation, unjust convictions, and imprisonment of the 
innocent. Statutory recourse is available for the victims of such wrongs, but 
under the current judicially invented system of prosecutorial immunity, few 
can collect damages. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for damages against 
“[e]very person who, under color of” state or local law, subjects “any 
citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.3 But questions 
 
1  See Jeffrey Toobin, Casualties of Justice, NEW YORKER, Jan. 3, 2011, at 39 (analyzing the 
reaction of the Department of Justice to the failed prosecution of Sen. Stevens); Katherine MacIlwaine, 
‘Innocent,’ CHRON. (Apr. 12, 2007), http://dukechronicle.com/article/innocent (reporting North Carolina 
Attorney General Roy Cooper’s decision to drop all charges against the indicted players). 
2  See Toobin, supra note 1; MacIlwaine, supra note 1. 
3  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
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of whether prosecutors should be immune from suit under § 1983, and if so, 
whether that immunity should be qualified or absolute, have been the 
source of considerable controversy for the last half century.4 Some argue 
that absolute prosecutorial immunity is indispensable, a necessary tool to 
protect public servants who, without immunity, would be buried under a 
mountain of frivolous § 1983 suits.5 Others see absolute prosecutorial 
immunity as unjust because it prevents genuinely wronged individuals from 
rightfully collecting damages from constitutional tortfeasors.6 Currently, 
most prosecutorial conduct is absolutely immune from § 1983 suits.7 
The distinction between absolute and qualified immunity has both 
practical and legal significance. Absolute immunity from suit protects an 
individual from liability regardless of his state of mind at the time he 
commits an alleged constitutional violation.8 Qualified immunity applies to 
a narrower range of conduct; it protects an individual from liability only for 
acts or omissions undertaken in good faith.9 Generally, actions undertaken 
in good faith include “conduct [that] does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”10 
Though under current law prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for 
many of their responsibilities, the Supreme Court has indicated that there 
are limits to this shield. A prosecutor wears many hats, and certain actions 
performed in the line of duty may not receive the highest level of immunity. 
Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suit for conduct “intimately 
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”11 This “phase” 
 
4  See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 57 
[hereinafter Johns, Reconsidering] (arguing that the Court should eliminate absolute prosecutorial 
immunity); Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW. 
U. L. REV. 277, 297–319 (1965) (analyzing the implications of the Court’s decision to recognize a 
plaintiff’s right to sue for civil rights violations under § 1983). 
5  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–28 (1976) (holding that prosecutorial immunity 
protects “the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper 
functioning of the criminal justice system”). 
6  See, e.g., Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 55; Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and 
Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 511 (2011) 
[hereinafter Johns, Unsupportable] (arguing for the application of qualified immunity in all cases); 
Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis: The Present Predicament of Prosecutorial 
Immunity and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (1996) (“Although prosecutors 
need some protection from suit, absolute immunity is too much.”). 
7  Because absolute immunity applies when prosecutors are acting as advocates, which is their 
primary duty, most prosecutorial conduct is absolutely immune. See Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, 
at 55–56. 
8  Joy Rushing & Lynne Bratcher, Section 1983 Defenses, 14 URB. LAW. 149, 150 (1982). 
9  Id. at 150. 
10  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
11  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). 
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begins once there is probable cause to arrest a defendant.12 For all other 
conduct that is not “intimately associated with the judicial phase,” a 
prosecutor enjoys only qualified immunity.13 
Over the past few years, the Court has reviewed a number of cases in 
which federal circuit courts attempted to chip away at the foundation of 
prosecutorial immunity by narrowing the scope of protected conduct.14 Thus 
far, the Court has maintained the line between absolute and qualified 
immunity using the standard synthesized by Imbler v. Pachtman15 and 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons16 to distinguish between prosecutorial and 
investigative conduct.17 
A significant amount of commentary has been dedicated to finding 
ways to improve the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity.18 Some 
critics push for changes to the way in which the Supreme Court interprets 
how and why prosecutors should be immune from suit.19 Others argue that 
 
12  See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993). 
13  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. 
14  See, e.g., al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft was not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity from suit for allegedly creating 
a practice under which the federal material witness statute was unlawfully employed to investigate or 
preemptively detain plaintiff for suspected terrorist activities), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011); 
Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (divided panel affirming trial court 
verdict that prosecutor’s office was liable under § 1983 for failure to train its prosecutors to divulge 
certain exculpatory evidence during a criminal trial, resulting in plaintiff’s wrongful conviction and 
incarceration), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1366 (2011); McGhee v. Pottawattamie Cnty., Iowa, 547 F.3d 
922, 933 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that prosecutor was not immune from suit for fabricating evidence 
prior to filing formal charges despite the fact that evidence was later used at trial), cert. granted, 129 S. 
Ct. 2002 (2009). 
15  424 U.S. at 431 (holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 when he 
is found to have acted within the scope of his official duties as prosecutor). 
16  509 U.S. at 274 (establishing that a prosecutor is not protected by absolute immunity until he has 
probable cause to arrest a defendant). 
17  See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085 (finding that then-Attorney General Ashcroft was 
entitled to immunity because he did not violate clearly established law); Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1356 (holding that a district attorney’s office cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a failure to 
train its prosecutors based on a single Brady violation). 
18  See, e.g., McNamara, supra note 6, at 1137 (“[T]he reasons for extending prosecutors absolute 
immunity no longer exist.”); Amanda K. Eaton, Note, Optical Illusions: The Hazy Contours of the 
Clearly Established Law and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer on the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. 
L. REV. 661, 694–96 (2004) (discussing different scholars’ suggestions for how to improve the qualified 
immunity doctrine). 
19  See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
historical support for the Imbler rule, which is based on the notion that prosecutors were protected by 
absolute immunity under the common law in 1871, is inaccurate); see, e.g., Johns, Reconsidering, supra 
note 4, at 53–59 (arguing that the Court’s current immunity jurisprudence is unmanageable and that it 
should eliminate absolute prosecutorial immunity); Jonathan K. Van Patten, Suing the Prosecutor, 
55 S.D. L. REV. 214, 250 (2010) (“[T]here is a serious question whether there is a principled basis on 
which to keep Imbler’s absolute immunity in balance with Buckley’s limited exception for qualified 
immunity based on function and probable cause.”). 
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regardless of what the Supreme Court decides, states and local 
municipalities should independently move to better protect wronged 
defendants.20 
However, as the debate over the Imbler–Buckley jurisprudence 
continues, the current scope of protections afforded to prosecutors outside 
of the judicially created immunity regimes has received decidedly less 
attention. This Note will argue that states and local municipalities have 
created a number of protections for public officials, including prosecutors—
such as indemnification legislation, private insurance, and other alternative 
liability mechanisms—to cover losses from torts they commit in the line of 
duty. These protections prevent prosecutors from shouldering the burden of 
personal financial liability even in instances in which they cannot don the 
cloak of absolute immunity. 
The driving force behind the Court’s absolute prosecutorial immunity 
case law has long been a desire to prevent the chilling effect on zealous 
prosecution that would inevitably emanate from the specter of personal 
liability in tort suits.21 The Court has embraced the concept that it is in the 
“broader public interest” that those who serve in this essential democratic 
function focus on their duties instead of their wallets.22 
Contrary to the Court’s concerns, a world without absolute 
prosecutorial immunity does not require the choice between financial 
security and zealous pursuit of duty. Considering the breadth of the 
protections mentioned above that are currently afforded prosecutors coupled 
with the opportunity for their expansion to additional jurisdictions, the 
justifications for maintaining the protective Imbler–Buckley standard are no 
longer a concern.23 In light of the existing variety of alternative 
prosecutorial protections, the Court should abandon its confusing absolute 
prosecutorial immunity jurisprudence once and for all. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the evolution of both qualified and 
absolute prosecutorial immunity in American law. It will detail the 
historical and public policy justifications the Supreme Court has advanced 
for prosecutorial immunity from § 1983 suits. It will also take into account 
criticisms of the Court’s jurisprudence and analyze the impact the Court’s 
 
20  See Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 74 (1999) (arguing that “a legislative remedy is the only reliable and fair 
response to the inevitable mistakes that occur as a byproduct” of the American criminal justice system); 
Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors 
to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 914–15 (1997) (arguing that state law 
causes of action should be utilized to circumvent the existence of absolute immunity as a federal 
constitutional bar to damage suits against prosecutors). 
21  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424–25 (1976). 
22  Id. at 427. 
23  See id. at 424–25 (“The public trust of the prosecutor’s office would suffer if he were constrained 
in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for 
damages.”). 
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decisions have had on plaintiffs seeking damages under § 1983. Part II will 
argue that the scope of the protections afforded to prosecutors outside of 
absolute immunity is more expansive and effective than the Supreme Court 
has recognized. It will argue further that a system in which indemnification, 
insurance, and other protections are substituted for absolute immunity 
would be more consistent with the spirit of § 1983.24 This Part will show 
why these alternatives minimize the concerns driving the Supreme Court’s 
hesitancy to roll back the reach of absolute immunity. Finally, Part III will 
address the criticisms of these protections as alternatives for absolute 
immunity and conclude that detractors overstate the difficulties of 
developing an expansive insurance and indemnification regime. 
I. THE IMBLER–BUCKLEY STANDARD AND ITS COSTS 
Official immunity from § 1983 is founded on a tradition that dates 
back to the Reconstruction Era.25 The Supreme Court’s interpretations of 
when, where, and how immunity applies to public officials has had a 
tremendous impact on the ability of parties to pursue causes of action under 
§ 1983. This Part will present an explanation of the historical development 
of § 1983 suits and the evolution of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding immunity from suit under the statute. Using a variety of 
examples, this Part will analyze the harms of prosecutorial misconduct and 
focus on situations in which victims of constitutional torts faced inadequate 
remedies or were denied compensation because of absolute prosecutorial 
immunity. Following these examples is an analysis and critique of the 
policy rationales that drive the Court’s current jurisprudence in the realm of 
absolute prosecutorial immunity. 
A. Section 1983, the Imbler–Buckley Rule, and the Current Standard for 
Prosecutorial Immunity 
Since the Supreme Court first gave 42 U.S.C. § 198326 teeth more than 
fifty years ago by holding that it provided for a federal right of action, the 
statute has grown into what is perhaps the most important tool through 
which victims who allege constitutional harms at the hands of state or local 
 
24  See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (“Insofar as petitioners contend that the basic 
purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the 
deprivation of constitutional rights, they have the better of the argument.”). 
25  See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372–73 (1951) (discussing the common law tradition of 
official immunity from suits for constitutional harms). 
26  Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” 
106:1883 (2012) Beyond Absolute Immunity 
 1889
officials may seek redress.27 It provides a cause of action to hold liable 
anyone who, under color of any state statute, deprives anyone of rights 
secured by the Constitution.28 In Monroe v. Pape, in which a policeman 
broke into and ransacked the plaintiff’s home, the Court first recognized the 
right to sue for civil rights violations under § 1983.29 As a result of Monroe, 
civil rights litigation against state and local governmental officials flowed 
into the federal courts. “While only 270 federal civil rights actions were 
filed in 1961, today between 40,000 and 50,000 § 1983 actions are 
commenced in federal court each year.”30 Several subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions and congressional actions expanded the pool of state actors 
who could be sued under § 198331 and also provided a financial incentive to 
bring claims by permitting the award of attorney’s fees.32 These and other 
developments contributed to an explosion in § 1983 litigation over the past 
five decades. 
The Supreme Court developed its § 1983 immunity jurisprudence by 
first finding immunity for legislative officials,33 then for judges,34 and 
 
27  See Harrington v. Grayson, 764 F. Supp. 464, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (stating that since Monroe 
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), § 1983 “has become one of the primary sources of relief for those 
individuals who seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t 
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 73 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It would be difficult to imagine a 
statute more clearly designed ‘for the public good,’ and ‘to prevent injury and wrong,’ than § 1983.”). 
28  § 1983. 
29  365 U.S. at 168–69, 187; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES 
FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 48 (1983) (“Monroe v. Pape was rightly perceived as a watershed decision, 
establishing § 1983 as a potent remedy that citizens could invoke affirmatively against official 
misconduct without the state’s help or indeed in the face of its opposition. It swiftly became the legal 
bulwark of the ripening civil rights movement; only two years after the decision, § 1983 litigation had 
grown by over 60 percent.”); Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 73–74. 
30  1 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 1.01[B], at 1-5 
(4th ed. Supp. 2007). In 1993, § 1983 cases accounted for 14% of the federal district court docket. 
Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 957 (4th Cir. 1995) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) 
(citing Robert G. Doumar, Prisoner Cases: Feeding the Monster in the Judicial Closet, 14 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 21, 23 (1994)) (observing that prisoners filed 878 § 1983 claims in 1967 and 33,000 in 
1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1177 (1996). 
31  See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1980) (holding that the § 1983 remedy is not limited to 
federal constitutional rights and may also be used to vindicate federal statutory rights, and that the 
federal statutes enforceable under § 1983 are not limited to those guaranteeing equal or civil rights); 
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (holding that municipal entities are subject 
to § 1983 liability when the violation of constitutional rights stems from the enforcement of a municipal 
policy or custom). 
32  See Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (authorizing 
awards of attorney’s fees to parties who prevail in actions or proceedings brought pursuant to § 1983). 
The statute provides incentive for individuals to enforce their federal rights under § 1983 and for 
attorneys to represent claimants in § 1983 actions. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006); 
see generally 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 1-9. 
33  See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951). 
34  See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967). 
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finally extending absolute immunity to prosecutors.35 As § 1983 became 
more widely used,36 the Court began to consider whether government 
officials deserved immunity against personal liability for their official 
actions. Because § 1983 contains no explicit immunity provisions for public 
officials,37 it was up to the courts to decide whether and to what extent 
officials would be immune from § 1983 suits. The Court concluded that 
Congress intended to preserve the established common law immunities that 
existed when the statute was enacted.38 The Supreme Court first turned to 
the historical common law for answers, examining the immunities that 
existed as a backdrop to the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act,39 the predecessor to 
§ 1983.40 
The Court focused on protections afforded to those performing 
legislative functions. By the time that Monroe established § 1983 as a 
remedy for constitutional harms caused by state and local government 
officials, the Court had already recognized absolute immunity for state 
legislative officials.41 In Tenney v. Brandhove, the Court held that state 
legislators are absolutely immune from liability for damages when they act 
“in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act.”42 Justice 
Frankfurter, writing for the majority, relied on a historical common law 
immunity tradition reflected in English and early American history, as well 
as the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution.43 Quoting 
a member of the constitutional Committee of Detail, Justice Frankfurter 
 
35  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976). 
36  In 1971, the Supreme Court recognized a companion remedy for constitutional violations 
committed by federal officials in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), opening up those officials to the specter of liability as well. This 
Note will focus on prosecutorial immunity from § 1983 liability—liability as against state and not 
federal actors—and will not directly address Bivens liability. It is notable, however, that the Supreme 
Court has held that in the course of analyzing the viability of an immunity defense, courts should 
examine the immunity question in actions brought under Bivens and § 1983 under the same standard. 
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (“[W]e deem it untenable to draw a distinction for 
purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought 
directly under the Constitution against federal officials.”). 
37  See § 1983. 
38  See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376–77. However, the Court has stressed that when “a tradition of 
absolute immunity did not exist as of 1871, we have refused to grant such immunity under § 1983.” 
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
39  See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553–54; Tenney, 
341 U.S. at 376–77. 
40  In 1871, Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act in response to outbreaks of terrorism directed 
against recently emancipated African-Americans, which were often perpetrated with the support of state 
and local officials. See SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 47; see also Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 
Stat. 13. Section I of the Act is currently codified as § 1983. 
41  See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372–73, 376; see also 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 7:3, at 7-9 (4th ed. 1997). 
42  341 U.S. at 379. 
43  See id. at 372–73. 
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reasoned that “[i]n order to enable and encourage a representative of the 
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is 
indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech” 
and be protected from reprisals for exercising that liberty.44 
Careful to maintain boundaries, however, the Court also limited the 
application of any legislative immunity from suit under § 1983 to conduct 
performed within the legislative function that the immunity was designed to 
protect.45 Therefore, legislative officials were not immune from suit for 
actions conducted outside of the legislative function, such as private 
publication of government documents.46 This functional approach to 
determining the scope of immunity for public officials—limiting immunity 
to conduct within the professional function the immunity was designed to 
protect—is the standard for analysis of judicial and prosecutorial immunity 
as well.47 
In Pierson v. Ray, the Court addressed the issue of absolute judicial 
immunity in § 1983 actions.48 Parallel to its analysis of legislative immunity 
in Tenney v. Brandhove, the Court found a rich common law tradition 
supporting absolute immunity for judges of general jurisdiction when they 
acted within the scope of their position.49 In defining the scope of judicial 
immunity, the Court again used a functional approach. Finding it necessary 
to more clearly define the contours of the judicial position’s scope, in Stump 
v. Sparkman the Court stated: 
[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a “judicial” one relate to 
the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by 
a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the 
judge in his judicial capacity.50 
Generally, the only circumstances where absolute immunity does not 
protect a judge are where the challenged conduct is accompanied by a clear 
absence of jurisdiction or where the challenged conduct is not a judicial act 
 
44  Id. at 373 (quoting 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896)). 
45  Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625–26 (1972) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 
U.S. 169, 172 (1966)) (holding that Sen. Mike Gravel’s attempt to have the Pentagon Papers published 
by a private publisher was not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause because the action was not 
related to the “due functioning of the legislative process”). 
46  See id. 
47  See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (extending § 1983 immunity to judges but 
limiting it to conduct related to the judicial role); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 
(1976) (extending § 1983 immunity to prosecutors but limiting it to conduct relating to the prosecutorial 
function). 
48  See 386 U.S. at 553–54. 
49  See id. (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of 
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction . . . .”). 
50   435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). 
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but is, for example, administrative in nature.51 Otherwise, absolute judicial 
immunity applies.52 By following this standard, courts have found that the 
inquiry into judicial immunity roughly parallels the inquiry into legislative 
immunity.53 
The Supreme Court finally considered the extent of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity in Imbler v. Pachtman,54 which is considered “the 
leading case on prosecutorial immunity.”55 In Imbler, the plaintiff sued a 
state prosecutor, alleging the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony 
and suppressed material evidence at trial, resulting in the defendant’s 
murder conviction.56 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, articulated the 
issue as “whether a state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of 
his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is amenable to 
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.”57 The Court held that the prosecutor was absolutely 
immune from suit.58 
The Court’s approach to establishing absolute prosecutorial immunity 
in Imbler was similar to its analyses in Tenney and Pierson. Justice Powell 
wrote that “Tenney established that § 1983 is to be read in harmony with 
general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation 
of them.”59 The Court then reasoned that Tenney, Pierson, and other cases 
that considered immunity to § 1983 suits were “predicated upon a 
considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant 
official at common law and the interests behind it.”60 After again 
undertaking a historical analysis, this time exploring prosecutorial 
immunity at common law, the Court found that “[t]he common-law 
immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that 
underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting 
within the scope of their duties.”61 Finding the common law immunity of 
prosecutors “well settled,” the Court then extended it to § 1983 suits, 
 
51  See 2 NAHMOD, supra note 41, § 7:14, at 7-49. An example of an act that would be administrative 
but not judicial in nature would be disparaging a campaign opponent in flyers. 
52  See id. 
53  See id. 
54  424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
55  2 NAHMOD, supra note 41, § 7:42, at 7-108. 
56  See 424 U.S. at 412–14. 
57  Id. at 410. 
58  Id. at 431. 
59  Id. at 418. 
60  Id. at 421. 
61  Id. at 422–23. But see Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that prosecutorial immunity did not exist at common law like judicial and legislative 
immunity); Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 75–77 (providing a deeper examination of the 
historical fallacy that Scalia points out in Kalina). 
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stating, “[T]he same considerations of public policy that underlie the 
common-law rule likewise countenance absolute immunity under § 1983.”62 
Just as it did with legislative and judicial immunity, the Court 
struggled to define how far to extend the scope of a prosecutor’s duties.63 
Justice Powell noted that there are situations where a prosecutor “no doubt 
functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court.”64 The 
Court indicated, as it had for judicial and legislative immunity, that absolute 
prosecutorial immunity ceases when an official acts outside of his quasi-
judicial function as an officer of the court.65 However, the Court declined to 
establish a concrete standard by which to distinguish those official 
functions from other administrative duties a prosecutor may undertake, 
noting that “[d]rawing a proper line between these functions may present 
difficult questions.”66 It has. 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Imbler to leave open 
the questions of whether and to what extent absolute immunity extends to a 
prosecutor’s administrative and investigative actions, both the Court and 
lower federal courts have spent the past few decades attempting to draw a 
clearer line. Unfortunately, they have had only limited success.67 For fifteen 
years, the Supreme Court allowed the lower courts to experiment with the 
reach of prosecutorial immunity before rendering its next opinion on the 
subject.68 During that time, federal appellate courts attempted to define what 
types of prosecutorial conduct were immune from suit under Imbler and 
what might give rise to liability. Prosecutorial conduct that the circuit courts 
deemed deserving of absolute immunity included decisions about whether 
to prosecute,69 suppressing exculpatory evidence (like in Imbler),70 
subpoenaing witnesses,71 preparing witness testimony,72 actions taken 
 
62  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424. 
63  See id. at 431 n.33. 
64  Id. 
65  See id. at 430. 
66  Id. at 431 n.33. 
67  See infra Part I.B (discussing the failure of the Imbler–Buckley line of cases in addressing 
constitutional harms committed by prosecutors). 
68  Following Imbler in 1976, the Court did not address issues surrounding prosecutorial immunity 
again until 1991. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991); see generally McNamara, supra note 6, at 
1145–46 (detailing post-Imbler developments). 
69  See Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991); Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 
1119 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103–04 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding prosecutor 
absolutely immune from suit for decision to proceed in a case after agreeing not to prosecute the 
defendant); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding prosecutors absolutely immune 
from suit for decision to present evidence to a grand jury). 
70  See Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 77, 80 (6th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor absolutely immune for 
failing to disclose exculpatory witness statement the § 1983 plaintiff specifically requested during his 
murder trial); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 558–59 (11th Cir. 1984). 
71  See Betts v. Richard, 726 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1984) (prosecutor immune from § 1983 liability for 
procuring a writ to secure plaintiff as a witness in a criminal proceeding). 
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during the plea bargaining process,73 and decisions to freeze a suspect’s 
assets.74 On the other hand, federal courts considered prosecutors to be 
acting in an investigatory capacity, and therefore only entitled to qualified 
immunity, when they ordered police to arrest certain suspects75 or organized 
raids.76 These attempts to set definitive boundaries in discrete, highly fact-
dependent scenarios may have led the Court to again consider the contours 
of prosecutorial immunity in 1991.77 
In Burns v. Reed, the Court held that a prosecutor has absolute 
immunity for participating in a probable cause hearing but only qualified 
immunity when he gives advice to the police.78 The core of the Court’s 
rationale was based on historical analogy: the common law did not 
absolutely immunize the activity of advising law enforcement officers.79 But 
the common law history was not the only factor that led the Court to reverse 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision that both actions were protected by absolute 
immunity. Interestingly, the Court also relied in part on the strength of the 
protections that qualified immunity provides, stating, “[T]he qualified 
immunity standard is today more protective of officials than it was at the 
time that Imbler was decided. ‘As the qualified immunity defense has 
 
72  See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1243–45 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a prosecutor 
who obtained assessments of bootprint evidence from expert witnesses and prepared those witnesses for 
trial was absolutely immune), vacated, 502 U.S. 801 (1991), and rev’d, 509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
73  See Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1981); see also McGruder v. Necaise, 733 
F.2d 1146, 1147–48 (5th Cir. 1984) (prosecutor absolutely immune when offering to drop criminal 
charges in exchange for defendant’s agreement to drop civil suit). 
74  See Ehrlich v. Giuliani, 910 F.2d 1220, 1223–24 (4th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor’s “preserv[ation of] 
the defendants’ assets for forfeiture proceedings” went beyond his investigative function into the area of 
his advocacy responsibilities, warranting absolute immunity). 
75  See Day v. Morgenthau, 909 F.2d 75, 77–78 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Arrests and searches . . . ‘are 
normally police functions, and they do not become prosecutorial functions merely because a prosecutor 
has chosen to participate.’” (quoting Robinson v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1987))). 
76  See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 632 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that a prosecutor deserves 
only qualified immunity for “planning and execution of a raid” because such conduct is functionally 
equivalent to the “activities of police officers allegedly acting under [their] direction” (quoting Hampton 
v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 1973))), rev’d in part, 446 U.S. 754 (1980). See 
generally McNamara, supra note 6, at 1146 (describing the development of immunity law post Imbler). 
77  Though not a suit involving § 1983, Mitchell v. Forsyth was a high-profile Bivens decision prior 
to 1991 that appeared to indicate the Court’s willingness to set definitive boundaries for the exercise of 
prosecutorial power. See 472 U.S. 511 (1985). In Mitchell, a four Justice plurality found that President 
Nixon’s former Attorney General John N. Mitchell was not entitled to absolute immunity for 
participating in wiretapping for alleged national security purposes. See id. at 521. The Court found that 
“[b]ecause Mitchell was not acting in a prosecutorial capacity,” he was entitled only to qualified 
immunity. Id. However, subsequent cases have shown that the momentum from Mitchell has not 
meaningfully narrowed the scope of acts that are considered prosecutorial rather than administrative in 
nature. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
78  500 U.S. 478, 492, 496 (1991). 
79  Id. at 492. The Court further rationalized its decision by declaring that it would be “incongruous 
to allow prosecutors to be absolutely immune from liability for giving advice to the police, but to allow 
police officers only qualified immunity for following the advice.” Id. at 495. 
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evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.’”80 This rationale is particularly 
important because it shows that the Court was willing to consider factors 
outside of its traditional analysis, which has largely consisted of matching 
historical common law traditions to prosecutorial functions. It also displays 
a willingness to entertain pragmatic considerations in deciding whether 
absolute immunity should apply.81 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons82 has perhaps done more than any other case to 
create a definitive test for the reach of absolute prosecutorial immunity. In 
that case, the Supreme Court placed generally applicable, discernable 
limitations on the doctrine. In Buckley, the plaintiff alleged that prosecutors 
shopped around for an expert to link him to a bootprint left at the scene of a 
murder, despite knowledge that he did not leave the print.83 The Court 
found, by a five-to-four vote, that prosecutors do not receive absolute 
immunity when they fabricate evidence prior to an indictment.84 The key 
question in Buckley was whether the prosecutors’ alleged “manufacture [of] 
false evidence” was part of their traditional role as courtroom advocates or 
was a function of their investigatory role.85 As the result indicates, the Court 
was sharply divided on the issue. 
The majority reasoned that because the prosecutors searched for 
evidence of the plaintiff’s involvement in the murder before there was 
probable cause to arrest him, they acted as investigators, outside the bounds 
of their protected quasi-judicial function.86 The dissent, by contrast, 
considered the prosecutors’ alleged fabrication of the evidence as 
“preparation for trial.”87 The dissent rejected the majority’s probable cause 
line, arguing that it would create perverse incentives, such as encouraging 
prosecutors to avoid pretrial investigations.88 Despite the dissenters’ 
concerns, the Buckley probable cause rule has endured. 
Buckley was particularly important because it created a bright-line rule 
establishing that absolute immunity cannot protect a prosecutor’s conduct 
until probable cause to arrest a defendant exists.89 However, the probable 
 
80  Id. at 494–95 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 
81  See infra Part II for a discussion of the alternative means of prosecutorial protections that do not 
rely on absolute immunity. 
82  509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
83  Id. at 272. 
84  Id. at 275–76. The Court also unanimously held that prosecutors are not absolutely immune from 
suit for making out-of-court statements about a defendant’s culpability. Id. at 277; id. at 279–80 (Scalia, 
J., concurring); id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
85  Id. at 272, 274 (majority opinion). 
86  Id. at 274–75. 
87  Id. at 284 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
88  Id. at 283. 
89  See also Van Patten, supra note 19, at 241. It is important to note that the Court stated that the 
“determination of probable cause” in a case does not render all of a prosecutor’s conduct going forward 
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cause line itself has come under fire from academics, judges, and even 
Justices for being difficult to apply and potentially unworkable.90 Buckley 
merely substitutes one difficult-to-administer standard for another. 
This line of cases, from Imbler to Buckley, makes absolute 
prosecutorial immunity from liability for damages during a § 1983 suit 
available when the prosecutor acts within his role as an advocate. Under 
Imbler, as long as the prosecutor’s activities are “intimately associated with 
the judicial phase of the criminal process” and are “functions to which the 
reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force,” prosecutorial 
immunity will apply.91 The practical challenge that endures, however, is 
how to determine which functions are, in fact, “intimately associated” with 
a prosecutor’s quasi-judicial function and where the corresponding line 
between absolute and qualified immunity should lie. As this Note will 
address, the Imbler–Buckley test has proven to be both unworkable and 
unjust.92 
B. Costs of the Imbler–Buckley Rule 
Under a regime of absolute immunity, even intentional misconduct 
resulting in a constitutional injury to a defendant will go without the 
possibility of civil redress so long as the action is within the scope of the 
prosecutor’s adversarial function.93 The Imbler Court pointed out that a 
prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity even if a plaintiff is able to show 
that the prosecutor acted wrongfully or even maliciously.94 Therefore, under 
Imbler, immunity protects a prosecutor who conspires to bring false 
criminal charges against a plaintiff;95 intentionally withholds evidence 
favorable to a plaintiff and instructs a witness to testify evasively, if not 
 
absolutely immune. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5. The majority envisioned instances where a prosecutor 
might do further investigative work at trial, for which he would receive only qualified immunity. Id. 
90  See infra Part I.D (discussing criticisms of the Imbler–Buckley rule). 
91  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). 
92  See infra Part I.D. 
93  See Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 337–38 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Imbler thus implicitly 
acknowledged that prosecutors retain discretion to determine what evidence is to be disclosed under 
Brady and that absolute immunity attaches to their exercise of discretion. . . . Nor was absolute 
immunity forfeited because the prosecutors continued to withhold the exculpatory evidence . . . .”); 
Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 53 (“[T]he victims of this [prosecutorial] misconduct are 
generally denied any civil remedy because of prosecutorial immunities.”). 
94  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–29. 
95  See Siano v. Justices of Mass., 698 F.2d 52, 57–58 (1st Cir. 1983) (plaintiff could not recover 
monetary damages against prosecutor for allegedly initiating a prosecution in bad faith); Perez v. 
Borchers, 567 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1221–22 
(3d Cir. 1977) (“[A] prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity ‘while performing his official duties’ as 
a officer [sic] of the court, even if, in the performance of those duties, he is motivated by a corrupt or 
illegal intention.” (quoting United States ex rel. Rauch v. Deutsch, 456 F.2d 1301, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972))). 
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falsely;96 or improperly has the plaintiff indicted and, at trial, induces a 
person to commit perjury and files false affidavits.97 
Several major studies indicate that significant numbers of innocent 
people have been convicted as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. The 
National Registry of Exonerations reports that misconduct by prosecutors 
and police occurred in 42% of the 873 exonerations that occurred in the 
United States from January 1989 through February 2012.98 There was 
official misconduct in 56% of homicide exonerations.99 A study by the 
Center for Public Integrity released in 2003 noted that since 1970, 
prosecutorial misconduct resulted in innocent people being convicted of 
crimes including murder, rape, kidnapping, and robbery in 28 cases 
involving 32 defendants.100 Some of these people even received death 
sentences.101 From 1992 to 2011, the Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law used DNA evidence to exonerate 289 people who 
were wrongly convicted.102 The organization reported that prosecutorial 
misconduct was a leading cause of the wrongful convictions.103 An 
Innocence Project report from 2000 indicated that in 67 cases in which 
innocent people were sent to death row and later exonerated by DNA 
evidence, prosecutorial misconduct was a factor in 26% of those cases.104 
In 1999, the Chicago Tribune conducted a national study that painted a 
vivid picture of some of the more egregious violations committed by 
prosecutors.105 The study found that since 1963, 381 homicide convictions 
were reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct.106 In describing some of the 
 
96  See Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221–22 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 
97  See Bruce v. Wade, 537 F.2d 850, 852 (5th Cir. 1976). 
98  SAMUEL M. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 67 (2012), available at http://www.law.umich. 
edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf. 
99  Id. 
100  CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S LOCAL PROSECUTORS 
i, 2, app. at 98–108 (2003). The study also indicated that since 1970, there had been more than 2000 
cases in which prosecutorial misconduct by state and local prosecutors was sufficient to require the court 
to dismiss charges, reverse convictions, or reduce sentences. Id. at app. 108; see also Johns, supra note 
4, at 60. 
101  CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 100; see also Johns, supra note 4, at 60–61. 
102  Know the Cases: Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
103  See EMILY M. WEST, INNOCENCE PROJECT, COURT FINDINGS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
CLAIMS IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AND CIVIL SUITS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA EXONERATION 
CASES 1 (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Innocence_Project_Pros_ 
Misconduct.pdf; see generally Johns, Unsupportable, supra note 6, at 512 (providing further anecdotal 
and statistical evidence of wrongful convictions). 
104  BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED xiv, app. 2 at 263 (2000). 
105  See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to 
Win (pt. 1), CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1. 
106  Id. 
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more serious forms of misconduct, reporters wrote, “[Prosecutors] have 
prosecuted black men, hiding evidence the real killers were white. They 
have prosecuted a wife, hiding evidence her husband committed suicide. 
They have prosecuted parents, hiding evidence their daughter was killed by 
wild dogs.”107 
When the Supreme Court adopted absolute prosecutorial immunity in 
Imbler and refined the doctrine in Burns, it justified its decision, in part, by 
noting the other existing deterrent and remedial mechanisms that would 
serve to protect the accused from prosecutorial abuse.108 It singled out 
several measures, such as the likelihood of discipline within the 
organization;109 “the remedial powers of the trial judge, appellate review, 
and state and federal post-conviction collateral remedies”;110 and the 
possibility that prosecutors could face criminal liability for the most abusive 
conduct.111 The Court was wrong in its assumptions about the availability of 
these remedies. Many of the studies cited above found that even in the most 
egregious, willful situations of prosecutorial misconduct, the remedial 
powers of the court were inaccessible or ineffective, and prosecutors were 
rarely disciplined, forced to pay a financial penalty, or criminally 
prosecuted.112 With little possibility of appellate or collateral review,113 
punishment, or financial reprisal under § 1983, the only significant 
safeguard deterring prosecutors from overstepping their bounds falls to the 
rules articulated by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland.114 In Brady, 
prosecutors pursuing a murder conviction withheld evidence from defense 
counsel that the defendant’s confederate had confessed to performing the 
actual killing.115 The Court found that a prosecutor has a constitutional 
obligation to provide the defense with all exculpatory material as a matter 
 
107  Id. 
108  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425–29 (1976); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 
492 (1991) (“[T]he safeguards built into the judicial system tend to reduce the need for private damages 
actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.” (alteration in original) (quoting Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
109  See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429. 
110  Id. at 427. 
111  See id.; see generally Johns, Unsupportable, supra note 6, at 517. 
112  See generally CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 100, app. at 78–90 (finding that of the more 
than 2000 cases of documented prosecutorial misconduct, prosecutors were disciplined in only 44 cases 
and were never criminally prosecuted); SCHECK ET AL., supra note 104, at 180–81; Johns, 
Unsupportable, supra note 6, at 516–21 (systematically deconstructing the Imbler Court’s assumptions 
about alternative protections for the accused using empirical studies); Armstrong & Possley, supra note 
105. See also Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 60–63; James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of 
Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2121–22 (2000). 
113  The remedial powers of the courts are not available in the 97% of cases that settle before going 
to trial, and even when prosecutorial misconduct in the 3% of cases can be appealed, the offense is 
usually found to be harmless. See Johns, Unsupportable, supra note 6, at 517. 
114  373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
115  Id. at 84. 
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of due process.116 If a prosecutor fails to produce the required information, 
the defendant is entitled to a new trial, provided the defendant can show 
there is a “reasonable probability” that the case would have turned out 
differently had the exculpatory evidence not been withheld.117 
Professor James S. Liebman has argued that Brady is largely 
ineffective as a disciplinary and remedial tool because prosecutors who 
commit misconduct receive little more than a “slap on the wrist” in the form 
of a reversal.118 In a comprehensive study of prosecutorial discipline, 
Professor Richard Rosen examined numerous public filings and contacted 
state bar associations in an attempt to uncover disciplinary cases involving 
prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence.119 Rosen found just nine 
cases where disciplinary action followed a Brady violation, four of which 
resulted in minor sanctions such as censure or reprimand, and just two of 
which resulted in a recommendation of disbarment.120 A similar study 
conducted in California found 159 instances from 1997 to 2009 in which 
appellate courts ruled that prosecutorial conduct in a criminal proceeding 
had resulted in harmful error.121 Only six prosecutors were disciplined for 
misconduct.122 Furthermore, immunity makes money damages almost 
entirely unavailable, injunctions to change policies and practices that led to 
the mistakes are nonexistent, and as just noted, discipline by the relevant 
bar or internal investigations rarely find punishable offenses even in 
situations where previously condemned prisoners have been released due to 
prosecutorial error.123 
Clearly, significant commentary has been dedicated to the proposition 
that the protections afforded to defendants in Brady and via other 
institutional safeguards are inadequate.124 These considerations indicate that 
 
116  Id. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective 
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
117  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984)). 
118  Liebman, supra note 112. 
119  See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A 
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 696–97 (1987). A 1996 article supplemented Professor Rosen’s 
research and found no additional Brady incidents for which prosecutors were publicly sanctioned. See 
McNamara, supra note 6, at 1184 n.396. 
120  Rosen, supra note 119, at 720–31. 
121  KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, PREVENTABLE 
ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009, at 18–19 (2010), 
available at http://law.scu.edu/ncip/file/ProsecutorialMisconduct_BookEntire_online version.pdf. 
122  Id. at 16. 
123  Liebman, supra note 112. 
124  See, e.g., Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 60–63; Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian 
Roulette: Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 33, 37–39 (2004); Liebman, supra note 112; Tracey L. 
Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial 
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the Imbler Court’s assumption that these alternative protections would 
ensure the lowest possible degree of prosecutorial misconduct in a world of 
absolute immunity were wrong. Many scholars have argued further that the 
inadequacy of these alternative protections stands as a justification for 
retreating from Imbler and scaling back absolute prosecutorial immunity.125 
Regardless, the standard for absolute prosecutorial immunity remains tied 
to the line Imbler and Buckley drew: the scope of the prosecutor’s 
adversarial function. However, as discussed below in Part I.D, the Court 
seems to be getting closer to reconsidering the standard. 
C. Policy Rationales for Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity 
In Imbler, the Supreme Court offered both historical and prudential 
reasons for why prosecutors deserve absolute immunity. This section will 
argue that the historical prong of the Court’s analysis is unconvincing, if not 
outright wrong, leaving its policy rationales as the strong remaining support 
for the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. 
As noted above, historical analogy plays perhaps the most significant 
role in the Court’s current jurisprudence regarding absolute prosecutorial 
immunity.126 In Imbler, the Court followed the Tenney approach, 
considering whether the Reconstruction Congress had intended to restrict 
the availability of immunity for state prosecutors in § 1983 suits.127 It 
reached the conclusion that the availability of absolute immunity for 
prosecutors was “well settled.”128 However, as jurists and scholars have 
noted, the Court’s historical analysis in this area was likely flawed.129 The 
Court’s justifications for why certain governmental functions should be 
immune from suit under § 1983 were heavily based on the common law 
immunities present in 1871 when Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, 
the precursor to § 1983.130 As Professor Margaret Z. Johns argues in two 
 
Incentives, 64 FORDHAM. L. REV. 851, 890–901 (1995); Rosen, supra note 119; Weeks, supra note 20, 
at 835. 
125  See generally Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 54 (“While qualified immunity strikes a 
balance between providing a remedy for egregious misconduct and protecting the honest prosecutor 
from liability, absolute immunity should be reconsidered.” (footnote omitted)); Johns, Unsupportable, 
supra note 6 (arguing for a reconsideration of absolute immunity); McNamara, supra note 6 (same). 
126  See supra Part I.A. 
127  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–18 (1976) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 
376 (1951)). 
128  Id. at 424. 
129  See, e.g., Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 55; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 
259, 279–80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499–500 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Imbler, 424 U.S at 437 (White, J., concurring) (“The public 
prosecutor’s absolute immunity from suit at common law is not so firmly entrenched as a judge’s, but it 
has considerable support.”). 
130  See supra Part I.A. 
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articles focusing on prosecutorial immunity, this justification is “just plain 
wrong”131: 
[E]ven assuming Congress intended to retain the existing common-law 
immunities, absolute prosecutorial immunity was not the established law in 
1871. In fact, the first case affording prosecutors absolute immunity was not 
decided until 1896. Congress could not have intended to retain this immunity 
when it adopted § 1983 because it simply did not exist at that time. Rather, in 
1871 prosecutors would have been accorded qualified immunity, not absolute 
immunity. Thus, the historical argument for absolute prosecutorial immunity is 
unfounded.132 
The Court has stressed that when “a tradition of absolute immunity did not 
exist as of 1871, we have refused to grant such immunity under § 1983.”133 
Therefore, it would seem the Court erred in its creation of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity in Imbler. 
Justice Scalia has also pointed out the historical fallacy of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity.134 In his concurrence in Burns, Justice Scalia noted 
that absolute immunity did not exist for any prosecutorial conduct in 
1871.135 He pointed out that the protection afforded to prosecutors in 1870 
was more akin to “quasi-judicial immunity,” which was not absolute and 
could be overcome by proving malice.136 With the historical prong of the 
justification for absolute prosecutorial immunity on shaky ground, the 
Court’s policy rationales for providing prosecutors with absolute immunity 
from suit under § 1983 stands as its strongest justification. This too has 
been under fire. 
Imbler has received perhaps its most vehement criticism due to the fact 
that an individual wronged by a prosecutor’s constitutional violations has 
little chance of recovering a damages award.137 However, it is important to 
note that this casualty of judicial discretion was intentional. The Imbler 
Court recognized the problem and determined that other interests should 
prevail.138 In Imbler, the Court faced a choice and placed the competing 
interests on a utilitarian scale. On the one hand, the Court had the interests 
 
131  Johns, Unsupportable, supra note 6, at 521; see also Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 107–
08. 
132  Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 54–55 (footnotes omitted). 
133  Burns, 500 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
134  Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132–33 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that unlike 
judicial and legislative immunity, prosecutorial immunity did not exist at common law in 1871). 
135  Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Billings v. 
Lafferty, 31 Ill. 318, 322 (1863); Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22, 44–52 (1854); and Wight v. Rindskopf, 
43 Wis. 344, 354 (1877)). 
136  Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
137  See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 111; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional 
Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 84–85 (1989); Liebman, supra 
note 112, at 2121–22. 
138  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–28 (1976). 
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of a person who had been sentenced to death and spent years in prison as a 
result of a prosecutor’s intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence and 
was now seeking some compensation for his suffering.139 But the Court 
maintained that on the other hand, there was no viable alternative to protect 
an essential public institution—the role of the prosecutor in a liberal 
democracy. The “alternative of qualifying a prosecutor’s immunity . . . 
would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s 
duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice 
system.”140 
At its most abstract, the core rationale for absolute prosecutorial 
immunity is that it best promotes the “broader public interest.”141 It is based 
on a concern that the possibility of personal liability will have a chilling 
effect on a prosecutor’s performance of his duties and hamper his 
independence: 
If a prosecutor had only a qualified immunity, the threat of § 1983 suits would 
undermine performance of his duties no less than would the threat of common-
law suits for malicious prosecution. A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his 
best judgment both in deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in 
court. The public trust of the prosecutor’s office would suffer if he were 
constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own 
potential liability in a suit for damages.142 
The Imbler Court added that its decision was driven by another 
practical fear—that less than absolute immunity would result in a specter of 
litigation that would distract prosecutors from their official duties.143 The 
Court was “concern[ed] that harassment by unfounded litigation would 
cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from his public duties, and 
the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the 
independence of judgment required by this public trust.”144 The Court also 
articulated a number of ancillary concerns that drove its decision, including: 
a greater chance of eventual prosecutor liability for suits that survive the 
pleading stage,145 the fact that certain suits would result in a virtual retrial of 
 
139  See id. at 411–17, 427 (explaining the factual and procedural history of the case and noting that 
absolute immunity “leave[s] the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor 
whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty”). 
140  Id. at 427–28. 
141  Id. at 427. 
142  Id. at 424–25. 
143  Id. at 423. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. at 425 (“Moreover, suits that survived the pleadings would pose substantial danger of 
liability even to the honest prosecutor. The prosecutor’s possible knowledge of a witness’ falsehoods, 
the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense, the propriety of a closing argument, and—
ultimately in every case—the likelihood that prosecutorial misconduct so infected a trial as to deny due 
process, are typical of issues with which judges struggle in actions for post-trial relief, sometimes to 
differing conclusions.”). 
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criminal offenses,146 an impact on prosecutorial decisionmaking that might 
deny the triers of fact in criminal proceedings (i.e., the jury) relevant 
information,147 and an adverse effect on the efficient functioning of the 
criminal justice system’s post-trial procedures.148 
Other courts have also commented on the dilemma of deciding 
between the twin evils of liability and immunity. Judge Learned Hand 
offered a similarly utilitarian justification in Gregoire v. Biddle,149 a 
malicious prosecution case cited by the Imbler Court,150 writing: 
As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the 
evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the 
end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to 
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.151 
Simply put, courts have decided that the need to protect the overwhelming 
majority of ethical prosecutors with absolute immunity outweighs the cost 
of creating a class of constitutional harms that have no possibility of 
recompense.152 
D. Criticisms of the Court’s Prosecutorial Immunity Jurisprudence 
As the previous section explains, the primary policy justifications for 
absolute prosecutorial immunity stress the need to avoid chilling vigorous 
prosecutions and the need to shield prosecutors from harassing or frivolous 
litigation. Though the Court has remained steadfast in supporting these 
justifications for the need to protect prosecutors, the reach of absolute 
immunity has been harshly criticized by jurists and scholars alike. In his 
 
146  Id. at 425 (“The presentation of such issues in a § 1983 action often would require a virtual 
retrial of the criminal offense in a new forum, and the resolution of some technical issues by the lay 
jury.”). 
147  Id. at 426 (“Attaining the system’s goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires 
that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct of the trial and the 
presentation of evidence. The veracity of witnesses in criminal cases frequently is subject to doubt 
before and after they testify, as is illustrated by the history of this case. If prosecutors were hampered in 
exercising their judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about resulting personal liability, 
the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence.” (footnote omitted)). 
148  Id. at 427 (“Various post-trial procedures are available to determine whether an accused has 
received a fair trial. These procedures include the remedial powers of the trial judge, appellate review, 
and state and federal post-conviction collateral remedies. In all of these the attention of the reviewing 
judge or tribunal is focused primarily on whether there was a fair trial under law. This focus should not 
be blurred by even the subconscious knowledge that a post-trial decision in favor of the accused might 
result in the prosecutor’s being called upon to respond in damages for his error or mistaken judgment.”). 
149  177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). 
150  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424 n.21. 
151  Gregoire, 177 F.2d at 581. 
152  For an argument that financial compensation for denials of constitutional rights should not be a 
goal of the justice system, see Jeffries, supra note 137, at 83 (“In my view, the goal of compensation for 
denials of constitutional rights is more problematic than has been supposed.”). 
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concurrence in Imbler, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, expressed unease about extending the potential scope of absolute 
immunity to cover knowing suppression of evidence.153 The Justices 
“believe[d] such a rule would threaten to injure the judicial process and to 
interfere with Congress’ purpose in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without any 
support in statutory language or history.”154 Justice White and the other two 
concurring Justices supported absolute immunity in specific situations, such 
as the one in Imbler itself, where prosecutors face allegations that “they 
knew or should have known that the testimony of a witness called by the 
prosecution was false.”155 In any other situation, however, Justice White felt 
that absolute immunity was improper.156 
Justice Rehnquist was another Imbler critic. He believed that the 
decision created an imbalance whereby some officials receive absolute 
immunity while others are left with only qualified immunity. In his dissent 
in Butz v. Economou, Justice Rehnquist pointed out the imbalance between 
offering judges and prosecutors absolute immunity for certain actions and 
not doing so for other officials.157 He posited that a dubious reason for the 
discrepancy might be that Justices are simply more personally attuned to the 
pressures that would be felt by judges and prosecutors in the absence of 
absolute immunity and are less readily able to empathize with the 
comparable concerns that weigh on non-judicial public officials.158 
Professor Johns argues that absolute immunity is unnecessary to meet 
the policy justifications the Court has advanced for it and should therefore 
be abolished.159 She argues that absolute immunity is “not needed to prevent 
frivolous litigation or to protect the judicial process.”160 Absolute immunity 
is unnecessary to protect the honest prosecutor since the requirements for 
establishing a cause of action,161 coupled with the defense of qualified 
 
153  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 433, 441 (White, J., concurring). 
154  Id. at 433. 
155  Id. at 440. 
156  Id. at 441 (“However, insofar as the majority’s opinion implies an absolute immunity from suits 
for constitutional violations other than those based on the prosecutor’s decision to initiate proceedings or 
his actions in bringing information or argument to the court, I disagree. Most particularly I disagree with 
any implication that the absolute immunity extends to suits charging unconstitutional suppression of 
evidence.”). 
157  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 528 n.* (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
158  Id. 
159  Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 55–56. 
160  Id. at 55. 
161  See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (“[I]n order to recover damages . . . a 
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged 
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called 
into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .”). 
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immunity, “will protect all but the most incompetent and willful 
wrongdoers.”162 She notes that: 
[U]nder a qualified immunity regime, the victim of misconduct can only 
maintain an action by defeating the criminal charges and proving that the 
prosecutor violated clearly established constitutional law with a culpable state 
of mind. And the qualified immunity defense has been strengthened to provide 
a complete defense at the earliest stages of litigation for all but the most 
inexcusable misconduct. Thus, qualified immunity provides prosecutors 
sufficient protection to ensure that they perform their functions independently, 
without undue timidity or distraction.163 
The Court itself has acknowledged that qualified immunity is adequate 
to protect an official from frivolous § 1983 litigation. As explained in Part 
I.A, the Burns Court noted that the qualified immunity standard now 
provides ample support to all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.164 This statement suggests that under the right 
circumstances, with the right protections in place, the Court may be willing 
to take a step back from a regime of absolute prosecutorial immunity. 
As cracks continue to appear in the Imbler–Buckley rationale, the 
Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. 
McGhee165 indicates that it may be ready to reconsider the increasingly 
unworkable standards that characterize the current prosecutorial immunity 
jurisprudence. The case presented the question of whether a prosecutor may 
be held liable under § 1983 for a wrongful conviction that occurred as a 
result of the prosecutor’s procurement of false testimony during a criminal 
investigation and subsequent use of that testimony at trial.166 In 1978, Curtis 
McGhee and Terry Harrington received life sentences for murdering a 
security guard.167 In 2003, Harrington’s conviction was overturned by the 
Iowa Supreme Court, which found that the prosecutor had obtained the 
convictions by offering perjured testimony, fabricating evidence, and 
suppressing material exculpatory evidence.168 Prosecutors subsequently 
agreed to vacate McGhee’s conviction.169 The two brought § 1983 suits 
against the prosecutors, the county, and the investigators involved in the 
case.170 
The suit presented crucial questions regarding the reach of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity. If a prosecutor fabricates evidence during the early 
 
162  Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 55. 
163  Id. at 55–56. 
164  Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 479–80 (1991); see supra Part I.A. 
165  547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2002 (2009). 
166  Id. at 932–33. 
167  Id. at 925. 
168  Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 524–25 (Iowa 2003). 
169  McGhee, 547 F.3d at 928. 
170  Id. at 925. 
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stages of a criminal investigation, does he receive only qualified immunity? 
Does the answer change if the prosecutor uses that evidence at trial during 
the course of his advocacy function, which is protected by absolute 
immunity? Does the dilemma posed by these questions indicate that the 
Imbler–Buckley standard is unworkable? The lower courts were split on the 
issue of whether qualified or absolute immunity applied if a prosecutor used 
tainted evidence at trial,171 indicating the issue was ripe for Supreme Court 
review. 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court in holding that, 
under Buckley, prosecutorial immunity does not extend to the fabrication of 
evidence before the filing of formal charges because it is not “a distinctly 
prosecutorial function.”172 The court went so far as to say that when a 
prosecutor’s misconduct consists of both fabricating evidence during an 
investigation and then using it at trial, no immunity—neither qualified nor 
absolute—shields the prosecutor from liability.173 
Although the case settled before the Supreme Court could render an 
opinion,174 the Justices’ comments during oral argument provide an 
interesting window into their dissatisfaction with Buckley’s investigatory–
advocacy line as the rubric for when prosecutorial immunity should 
apply.175 A series of questions between Justice Alito and respondent’s 
counsel regarding the adequacy of the investigatory–advocacy line 
indicated skepticism about its practical utility and continued viability.176 
Probing the application of Buckley to the facts of the case, Justice Alito 
wanted to know where the “line to be drawn between the investigative stage 
and the prosecutorial stage” falls when a § 1983 claim is based on the 
evaluation of the truthfulness of a testifying witness.177 Respondent’s 
conception of that line—that the investigatory phase is a search to establish 
probable cause and not part of the advocacy function of shaping a witness 
for trial—evidences the difficulty and arbitrariness inherent in applying 
Buckley to criminal investigations, where the existence of probable cause is 
 
171  The Third Circuit held that absolute immunity applies, Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118, 
123 (3d Cir. 2000), while the Second and Ninth Circuits apply qualified immunity, Milstein v. Cooley, 
257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000). 
172  McGhee, 547 F.3d at 933. 
173  Id. 
174  David G. Savage, Iowa County Settles with 2 Men, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, at A9. 
175  See generally Van Patten, supra note 19, at 250–52 (“The granting of certiorari and the 
subsequent oral argument in the Pottawattamie County case provides some evidence of dissatisfaction 
on the Court with the existing case law. . . . [T]here is a serious question whether there is a principled 
basis on which to keep Imbler’s absolute immunity in balance with Buckley’s limited exception for 
qualified immunity based on function and probable cause.”). 
176  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–29, Pottawattamie Cnty., Iowa v. McGhee, No. 08-1065 
(Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-
1065.pdf. 
177  Id. at 27. 
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often in flux.178 It makes sense, then, that Justice Alito was wholly 
unsatisfied with a rule that relies on a shaky distinction between advocacy 
and investigation, which itself turns on a witness’s frequently changing 
status as the target of a criminal investigation or prosecution versus a 
resource to the police or prosecutor when the focus turns to another.179 
In this exchange and others during oral argument, Justice Alito and 
Justice Scalia, who made comments similar to Justice Alito’s,180 indicated 
skepticism regarding two important and ongoing problems with the Buckley 
standard: first, whether a principled distinction exists between the 
prosecutorial and investigatory functions and second, whether the Buckley 
standard, which relies on probable cause as the dividing line between 
investigatory and prosecutorial functions, is workable given practical 
fluctuations in the presence of probable cause.181 Chief Justice Roberts 
seemed to share these concerns.182 
Although these comments during oral argument are by no means 
dispositive, they suggest that at least three Justices—all of them toward the 
politically conservative end of the Court183—are dissatisfied with the current 
 
178  See id. at 28 (“[B]efore probable cause, when prosecutors are engaging in investigatory 
functions, I don’t think we want them shaping the witness for trial. I think we want them trying to figure 
out who actually committed this crime and who would we have probable cause to perhaps initiate 
process against.”). 
179  See id. at 28–29 (“What concerns me about your argument is the—is a real fear that it will 
eviscerate Imbler . . . . [L]et’s take the case of the prosecution of a . . . CEO of a huge corporation for 
insider trading or some other white-collar violation. And the chief witness against this person is, let’s 
say, the CFO of this company, who when initially questioned by law enforcement officials and 
investigatory officials, made—made statements denying any participation in any wrongdoing, but 
eventually changed his story and testifies against the CEO at trial in exchange for consideration in a plea 
deal. Now, your argument, in a case like that—or you could change the facts, make it an organized 
crime case, make it a prosecution of a drug kingpin who’s testifying—the witness against him is a 
lower-ranking person in the organization who has a criminal record, maybe has previously committed 
perjury, has made numerous false statements, is subject to impeachment. In all of those cases a claim 
could be brought against the prosecutor.”). 
180  See id. at 39 (“[W]hat’s the use of giving [the prosecutor] liability later on if—if you can simply 
drag him into litigation by—by alleging that he at an earlier stage committed a violation?”). 
181  Justice Alito later argued, “[P]robable cause is—is evanescent. It comes, and it goes. It 
is . . . inextricably intertwined with what the prosecutor is doing in questioning the witness.” Id. at 52. 
182  Chief Justice Roberts posited that preparing for a case and investigating can occur 
simultaneously, thus conflating the Buckley distinction, when he commented: 
 We have also recognized that in the prosecutorial area . . . sometimes, you’re investigating and 
preparing your case at the same time.  
 You don’t just sit back and say . . . I’m just going to look and see what I can find. You have 
particular areas. The prosecution requires you to show four things, So [sic] you are looking at 
those four things. You are preparing your case, and you’re investigating.  
Id. at 50–51.  
183  See Adam Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1 
(“Four of the six most conservative justices of the 44 who have sat on the court since 1937 are serving 
now: Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Antonin Scalia and, most conservative of all, Clarence 
Thomas.”). 
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test for absolute prosecutorial immunity. The liberal wing of the Court also 
seems wholly dissatisfied with the Court’s recent § 1983 jurisprudence as it 
relates to prosecutors, as evidenced by the result in Connick v. Thompson.184 
That opinion, written by Justice Thomas and decided by a 5–4 vote that fell 
strictly along the conservative-to-liberal spectrum of Justices, held that a 
district attorney’s office cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a failure to 
train its prosecutors based on what the majority characterized as a single 
Brady violation.185 In the case, John Thompson was convicted of robbery 
and murder, spent eighteen years in prison, and came within one month of 
his execution before prosecutors revealed they had withheld, in violation of 
Brady, a crime lab report that cast doubt on his guilt.186 Justice Ginsburg 
read a vigorous dissent from the bench,187 which highlighted the deliberate 
indifference of the prosecutors to Thompson’s rights and the fact that the 
office “never disciplined or fired a single prosecutor” and had “one of the 
worst Brady records in the country.”188 
These cases and the exchanges the Justices had about them indicate 
that the Court may be losing confidence in the idea that the Imbler–Buckley 
rule can continue to provide a workable standard for when prosecutors 
should be immune from suit for constitutional torts. The time may be ripe 
for the Court to articulate a new standard and scope for prosecutorial 
immunity. 
If the Court does so, it should consider the fact that the cloak of 
absolute immunity is not actually necessary to protect prosecutors from 
facing the possibility of personal liability for alleged wrongs they 
committed in office. The law can protect a prosecutor in a manner parallel 
to absolute immunity while simultaneously compensating a person who has 
suffered a constitutional wrong stemming from the prosecutor’s conduct. 
This is because states already have in place systems that would protect 
prosecutors from ultimate liability even if the Court were to abandon its 
confusing and unjust prosecutorial immunity jurisprudence. 
State indemnification of prosecutors facing § 1983 provides a better 
way to reconcile the Court’s desire to protect the honest prosecutor while 
also providing compensation to parties harmed by unethical prosecution. A 
universal qualified immunity standard—paired with state-level indemnity—
would result in two important benefits: it would be more equitable than the 
current regime and would simultaneously create less ambiguity than does 
the confusing Imbler–Buckley test. Part II will explore state indemnification 
schemes and argue that this mechanism provides prosecutors with 
 
184  131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). 
185  Id. at 1366. 
186  Id. at 1355–56. 
187  Adam Liptak, $14 Million Jury Award to Ex-Inmate Is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2011, at 
A14. 
188  Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1370, 1382–84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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essentially the same protection from ultimate financial liability that they 
currently enjoy, while allowing the Court to shape a more workable and fair 
jurisprudence than exists under Imbler and Buckley. 
II. THE VALUE OF INDEMNIFICATION 
This Part demonstrates that an indemnification regime coupled with 
universal qualified prosecutorial immunity would be preferable to the 
current Imbler–Buckley absolute immunity standard. First, this Part argues 
that because the current absolute immunity regime that the Supreme Court 
has created is at odds with § 1983 as enacted, state indemnification189 
schemes provide a desirable alternative. Next, this Part argues that even if 
absolute immunity were curtailed, the various indemnification laws and 
policies, insurance, and other protections created by states, coupled with 
qualified immunity, would still shield prosecutors from § 1983 suits. This 
Part concludes by exploring situations in which legislatures and other 
government entities have embraced insurance and indemnification regimes 
in response to a judicial retreat from immunity protections and by 
analogizing them to the effects of a potential cutting back of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity. 
A. The “Fundamental Purpose” of § 1983 and Why Imber–Buckley 
Doesn’t Fit 
The Supreme Court has identified compensation for constitutional 
injuries as a “fundamental purpose” of § 1983.190 It has noted that the 
enduring purpose of § 1983 “is to provide compensatory relief to those 
deprived of their federal rights by state actors.”191 Many other Supreme 
Court and lower federal court opinions also reflect this sentiment,192 as do 
the comments of individual Justices.193 
 
189  This Note defines indemnification as the duty of a local, state, or federal government body to 
make good any loss, damage, or liability incurred by one of its officials. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
837 (9th ed. 2009). 
190  Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (arguing that denial of compensation 
for a constitutional injury would “be contrary to the fundamental purpose of § 1983”). 
191  See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988) (“[T]he central purpose of the Reconstruction-Era 
laws is to provide compensatory relief to those deprived of their federal rights by state actors. Section 
1983 accomplishes this goal by creating a form of liability that, by its very nature, runs only against a 
specific class of defendants: government bodies and their officials.”). 
192  See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980) (singling out deterrence and 
compensation as “two of the principle policies embodied in § 1983”); Owen v. City of Independence, 
445 U.S. 622, 650–54 (1980) (emphasizing “the societal interest in compensating the innocent victims 
of governmental misconduct” as a key motivation behind § 1983 liability); Jeffries, supra note 137, at 
84 n.7. 
193  See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 313 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (noting compensation is “the basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award” (quoting Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (internal quotation mark omitted))); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 
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Of course, many factors foreclose the availability of compensation for 
constitutional harms.194 For example, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes 
states and state agencies against damages suits.195 Even in an instance where 
a state officer may be sued for individual misconduct, the requirement that 
the suit be brought against an individual and not the state means that a 
plaintiff cannot usually sue a “deep pocket.”196 Juries may be more 
sympathetic to the individual public servant than they would be to the 
government.197 Furthermore, “[t]he focus on individual responsibility tends 
to divert attention from problems of government structure and organization, 
as distinct from the specific acts of individual officials.”198 Another barrier 
to compensation is the fact that state law statutes of limitation bar most of 
the tort and civil rights actions that would otherwise be brought.199 Finally, 
and most importantly, all state or federal government officials can claim 
some sort of immunity against damage awards.200 The result is that 
compensation is always extremely difficult, and often impossible, to come 
by.201 
The unfairness of such a regime is plain, and a fix is required. In his 
book Suing Government, Professor Peter Schuck proposes that government 
be “obliged to compensate for every harmful act or omission committed by 
its agents within the scope of their employment that is tortious under 
applicable law.”202 This model envisions a “state conceived of not as an 
autonomous sovereign overarching civil society but as an accountable 
instrument of collective will. When the collectivity seeks to fulfill benign 
aspirations but errs and injures, as it often will, it must—like anyone else—
repair its damage and compensate its victims.”203 At least one of the 
architects of the Reconstruction Amendments, Representative Benjamin 
 
U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying compensation and deterrence as fundamental 
purposes of § 1983); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 599 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(specifying compensation as one of § 1983’s “critical concerns”); Jeffries, supra note 137, at 84 n.8. 
194  Jeffries, supra note 137, at 84–85. 
195  Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). 
196  Jeffries, supra note 137, at 85. 
197  Id. 
198  Id.; see also Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 259 (1986) (discussing the harms that can stem from inadequate institutional 
structures). 
199  Bernhard, supra note 20, at 87. 
200  See supra Part I.A. 
201  Some scholars argue that state indemnification statutes are the only way that those who suffer 
constitutional harms at the hands of the state can receive compensation. See Bernhard, supra note 20, at 
86 (“Although innocent people can be convicted anywhere, only those convicted in jurisdictions with an 
indemnification statute have a remedy at law for the harm suffered.”). 
202  SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 111 (“Allowing for the differences between the substantive legal 
norms applicable to public officials and private actors, government ought to occupy no better position 
vis-à-vis its citizens than its citizens do vis-à-vis one another.”). 
203  Id. at 111–12. 
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Franklin Butler, shared this belief, stating on the House floor during the 
debates surrounding the Amendments in 1871, “We are there a community, 
and if there is any wrong done by our community, or by the inhabitants of 
our community, we will indemnify the injured party for that wrong . . . .”204 
Such a society is a worthy ideal that we should strive to emulate.205 
America can move more closely toward an ideal of broader 
compensation for those injured in the realm of § 1983 suits against 
prosecutors by shifting costs to the state or federal government. The 
question is: What model of cost-shifting would best serve the Supreme 
Court’s rationales behind the Imbler–Buckley line of cases while better 
serving Congress’s goal of compensation under § 1983? The answer this 
Note will explore in the next section is state indemnification of prosecutors 
facing § 1983 suits. 
B. Availability of State Indemnification of Prosecutorial Liability for 
§ 1983 Suits 
In the private sector, when a corporate officer is found liable for 
misconduct or injury based on actions committed while exercising her 
official duties, the corporation will often protect the individual from 
personal liability via contract, insurance, indemnity, or additional 
compensation.206 As these protections have become more commonplace in 
corporate law, they have garnered significant academic and judicial 
attention.207 While academics have paid attention to the similar evolution 
that has occurred in the indemnification of public officials,208 the Supreme 
Court has not. 
 
204  CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 792 (1871). 
205  Detractors argue that as attractive an ideal as it may be, the realities of society dictate that there 
will always be injuries that go without redress. See Jeffries, supra note 137, at 90–91 (“In the real 
world . . . even devastating losses routinely go unredressed. . . . Governments cause many harms. Some 
result from unconstitutional conduct; others from lawful action. From a distributive point of view, the 
difference is immaterial. Neither the severity of the injury nor the degree of resulting hardship depends 
on the legality of the government’s act. Lawful government action may cause devastating harm, while 
even flagrant unconstitutionality may injure only slightly.”). 
206  See ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING 
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 972–77 (11th ed. 2010) (“Today . . . it would be 
difficult to persuade responsible persons to serve as directors if they were compelled to bear personally 
the cost of vindicating the propriety of their conduct in every instance in which it might be challenged.” 
(quoting MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8 subch. E, intro. cmt. at 8-72 (2008))). 
207  See, e.g., id.; Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the 
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE. L.J. 1078 (1968); James J. Hanks, Jr. & 
Larry P. Scriggins, Protecting Directors and Officers from Liability—The Influence of the Model 
Business Corporation Act, 56 BUS. LAW. 3, 5–8 (2000) (examining the background of judicial decisions 
leading to the first statutory provisions for the indemnification and exculpation of directors).  
208  See generally Bernhard, supra note 20, at 101–10 (discussing the development of state 
indemnification law); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 
84 VA. L. REV. 47, 50 & n.16 (1998) (reporting on the basis of “personal experience” that state 
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Writing in 1983, Professor Schuck noted that the Supreme Court had 
seldom addressed the fact that most government officials have the ability to 
shift potential liability costs to the government.209 For example, in Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, the Court in 1982 reframed its standard for qualified immunity 
to afford officials enhanced protection due to a fear that the previous 
articulation of the standard had permitted too many harassing and frivolous 
lawsuits.210 In essence, the Court relied heavily on the assumption that 
without immunity public officials would face the threat of personal liability 
for constitutional violations committed in the performance of their official 
duties.211 This assumption was, and continues to be, wrong.212 
The modern Court continues to harbor these erroneous assumptions. In 
Richardson v. McKnight, the Court addressed the applicability of qualified 
immunity to employees of private companies performing state functions, 
such as contracted correctional officers.213 The Court concluded that 
employees of a private company are different from government employees 
in “critical” ways and therefore are not entitled to qualified immunity.214 
One of the “critical” distinctions the Court focused on was that private 
employers can purchase liability insurance and indemnify their employees, 
thereby reducing an individual’s exposure to personal liability.215 The 
Court’s logic is flawed; it wrongly assumes that unlike employees of private 
companies, government employees do not have the opportunity to shift 
potential personal liability to their employers and thus need the protections 
of qualified immunity. 
Like in Harlow, the Court overlooked the fact that just like employees 
of private companies, government employees have the ability to shift costs 
to their employers via insurance and indemnification.216 This section will 
show that the Court’s assumptions regarding the extent of government 
 
indemnity is widely available); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a 
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1019 (2000) (reporting that indemnification is “generally 
thought to be widespread”). 
209  SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 83. 
210  See 457 U.S. 800, 814–18 (1982); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of 
the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 465 (2002). 
211  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer 
Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 495–96 (2011). 
212  See Fallon, Asking the Right Questions, supra note 211, at 496 & n.94 (noting the scholarly 
consensus that most officials are indemnified against personal liability for actions committed in 
pursuance of their official responsibilities); supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
213  521 U.S. 399, 401 (1997). 
214  Id. at 409 (pointing out the presence of “certain important differences” between public and 
private employees “that, from an immunity perspective, are critical”). 
215  Id. at 411 (noting that insurance and indemnification “reduce[] the employment-discouraging 
fear of unwarranted liability potential applicants face”). 
216  See Richard Frankel, The Failure of Analogy in Conceptualizing Private Entity Liability Under 
Section 1983, 78 UMKC L. REV. 967, 979 (2010) (pointing out the Court’s flawed reasoning in 
Richardson). 
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indemnification, which form a key part of the Court’s immunity doctrine, 
are wrong. 
The Supreme Court continues to give little attention to alternative 
prosecutorial protections. Justice Alito’s comments during the 
Pottawattamie oral argument reflected deep concerns that the vagaries of 
the Imbler–Buckley standard might open up prosecutors to personal 
liability.217 He made no mention of the possibility of protections outside of 
absolute immunity, such as indemnification. The Court has continued to 
gloss over the fact that even if immunity were curtailed in certain situations, 
prosecutors would still be protected from personal liability by other means. 
The reality is that there exist a wide variety of resources that protect public 
officials, including prosecutors, from ultimate liability in § 1983 suits.218 
The chief means of protection are legal defense funds and 
indemnification provisions established by statute or insurance.219 As there 
exists no federal right to indemnification provided in § 1983,220 it falls to the 
states to indemnify their officials from potential losses in a § 1983 action.221 
Therefore, whether a prosecutor, absent absolute immunity, would be 
entitled to indemnification of § 1983 liability is based on interpretations of 
applicable state and local indemnification provisions.222 
The overwhelming majority of scholars who have studied state 
statutory indemnification of government officials believe that it is now 
widely available.223 Though Professor Schuck noted many years ago that 
indemnification was “neither certain nor universal,”224 the legal landscape 
has changed significantly since his writing in the early 1980s, and more 
importantly, since the Supreme Court decided Imbler in 1976. Though no 
empirical study has sought to definitively examine the precise scope of 
governmental indemnification, there exist many scholarly examinations that 
 
217  See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
218  SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 83–84. 
219  See id. at 83–85. 
220  Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.3d 842, 845 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds 
by Acri v. Varian Assocs., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997). 
221  Martin A. Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed that Municipality Will Indemnify Officer’s 
§ 1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1216–17 & n.32 (2001). 
222  Id. at 1217 & n.33. 
223  See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 208, at 49–50 & n.16 (“Very generally, a suit against a state officer 
is functionally a suit against the state, for the state defends the action and pays any adverse judgment. So 
far as can be assessed, this is true not occasionally and haphazardly but pervasively and dependably.”); 
Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and 
Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 812 (2007) (“Public employers are usually required by statute to 
indemnify their employees or otherwise pay judgments against those employees arising from torts 
committed within the scope of their employment . . . .”); Schwartz, supra note 221, at 1217 (“States and 
municipalities often indemnify officers found personally liable for compensatory damages under 
§ 1983.”). 
224  SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 85. 
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indicate that the scope is extremely broad, if not universal.225 Nearly every 
state in the union and the District of Columbia now provides some form of 
indemnification protection for government employees facing potential 
damages for torts committed in the exercise of their employment.226 Though 
the language in these statutes varies from state to state, they “commonly 
require that to be entitled to indemnification, the employee must (1) have 
acted within the scope of employment, and (2) not have engaged in 
intentional, reckless, or malicious wrongdoing.”227 As a result, “the state or 
local government officer who is acting within the scope of his or her 
employment in something other than extreme bad faith can count on 
government defense and indemnification.”228 These statutes now provide far 
broader protection for state prosecutors than the Imbler Court was aware of 
or could have imagined in 1976. 
In 1976, when the Supreme Court decided Imbler, just twenty state 
legislatures had passed indemnification statutes that protected any 
government employees from § 1983 suits.229 More than thirty-five years 
have passed since the Imbler Court articulated its core policy rationale for 
absolute prosecutorial immunity—the fear that qualified immunity would 
cause a prosecutor to become “constrained in making every decision by the 
consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for 
damages.”230 During that time, many of the states that already had 
indemnification provisions in place—provisions that often provided limited 
 
225  See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 
72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987) (noting that a study of all § 1983 suits in one federal district found 
no case in which an individual officer was forced to pay the cost of an adverse constitutional tort 
judgment). 
226  See Rosenthal, supra note 223, at 812 n.51 (providing an exhaustive list of state indemnification 
statutes). 
227  Schwartz, supra note 221, at 1217 (footnote omitted). 
228  Jeffries, supra note 208, at 50. 
229  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-621(P) (2004 & Supp. 2011) (enacted 1973); CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 825 (West 1995 & Supp. 2012) (enacted 1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-465 (West 2008) 
(enacted 1957); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-903(b)–(c) (2010) (enacted 1976); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
10/9-102 (West 2005) (enacted 1965); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 669.22 (West 1998 & Supp. 2011) (enacted 
1975), 670.8 (West 1998 & Supp. 2011) (enacted 1873); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5108.1 (2006) 
(enacted 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.736, subdiv. 9 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (enacted 1976), 
466.07 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012) (enacted 1963); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305 (2011) (enacted 1974); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-1801 (2007) (enacted 1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:105 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(enacted 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:10-1, -4 (West 2006) (enacted 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-
4(C)–(E) (2011) (enacted 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.3 (2011) (enacted 1967); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 30.285 (2011) (enacted 1967); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 3-19-1 to -3 (2004) (enacted 1969); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 29-20-310 (2000 & Supp. 2011) (enacted 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (2011) 
(enacted 1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1520 (2008) (enacted 1968); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.46 (West 
2006 & Supp. 2011) (enacted 1943). 
230  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424–25 (1976). 
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or optional coverage to a small subset of local employees231—have brought 
coverage to an expanding universe of officials not provided for under the 
original statutory schemes.232 Furthermore, at least twenty-five more states 
and the District of Columbia have added their own indemnification statutes, 
protecting government employees, including prosecutors, from the threat of 
personal liability that the Imbler Court so feared.233 The legal landscape 
regarding state indemnification that the Imbler Court was operating under 
has undergone monumental change. As the dissent in Richardson stated, 
“the availability of” insurance or indemnification “decreases . . . the need 
for immunity protection.”234 The expansion of indemnity protections 
indicates that yet another of the Imbler Court’s key policy concerns driving 
the existence of absolute prosecutorial immunity has vanished. 
 
231  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-621(P); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-465; N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 31:105; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-310; VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1520. 
232  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.04 (2003) (enacted 1984) (expanding indemnification 
coverage to include punitive or exemplary damages); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-141d(a) (West 2007) 
(enacted 1983) (expanding liability coverage of state officers and employees to include indemnification 
and legal defense); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-A:2 (LexisNexis 2008) (enacted 1979) (expanding 
indemnification coverage beyond school and public health officials); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-112(a) 
(1999) (enacted 1982) (expanding permissive indemnity beyond local government employees to include 
payment of damages following civil actions against state employees); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-1837 
(2011) (enacted 1980) (creating insurance scheme to protect employees as part of extensive risk 
management plan). 
233  See ALA. CODE § 11-47-24 (LexisNexis 2008 repl.) (enacted 1988); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-
203(a) (2004) (enacted 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-118(2)(a) (2011) (enacted 1979); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, § 4002 (1999) (enacted 1978); D.C. CODE § 1-109(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (enacted 1997); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 45-9-22(a) (West 2003) (enacted 1978); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-13-3-5, 34-13-4-1 
(West 2011) (enacted 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6109 (1997) (enacted 1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 65.2005 (LexisNexis 2004) (enacted 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8112 (2004) (enacted 
1977); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-303 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006) (enacted 1987); 
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 12-404 (LexisNexis 2009) (enacted 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, 
§§ 9 (LexisNexis 2004) (enacted 1978), 9A (LexisNexis 2004) (enacted 1982), 13 (LexisNexis 2004) 
(enacted 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-7(3) (2002) (enacted 1984); MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.711(2)(2) 
(West 1997 & Supp. 2012) (enacted 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0349 (LexisNexis 2012) 
(enacted 1979); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 17(2)–(3) (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2012) (enacted 1978), 18 
(McKinney 2008) (enacted 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-12.1-04(4) (2010) (enacted 1977), 32-12.2-
03(4) (2010) (enacted 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.87 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (enacted 1980), 
2744.07(A) (West 2006) (enacted 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 162 (West 2008) (enacted 1978); 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8550, 8548 (West 2007) (enacted 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-12(a) 
(1997 & Supp. 2011) (enacted 1979), 45-15-16 (2009) (enacted 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-11-440 
(2005) (enacted 2003), 12-4-325(A) (2000) (enacted 1998); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§§ 102.002, 104.001 (West 2011) (enacted 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.075 (West 2006) 
(enacted 1989); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12A-11(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008) (enacted 1986); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-39-104(c) (2011) (enacted 1979); see also Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative 
Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1517–18 (11th Cir. 1986) (interpreting Florida statute to mandate indemnification 
of state officers for all unintentional conduct); Livesay v. Balt. Cnty., 862 A.2d 33, 38 (Md. 2004) 
(interpreting Maryland statute to require indemnification of local employees). 
234  Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 420 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
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As Professor Schuck points out, there is significant variation in the 
type and scope of indemnification that state statutes provide. Some state 
laws provide for mandatory (or permissive) indemnification for employees 
of any governmental entity,235 whereas others cover only state employees, 
leaving municipal employees to local discretion.236 Most states now 
mandate indemnification and defense of most state and local employees, 
either by making the governmental entity liable for official torts237 or by 
retaining officials as nominal defendants and requiring the entity to pay 
their costs.238 In some cases, blanket statutes cover all employees;239 other 
states have individual statutes to address different categories of officials. 
“Significantly, most laws preclude government liability for ‘bad faith’ 
conduct, and some condition indemnification on good faith cooperation by 
the official in the defense of the case.”240 Regardless of their specific 
language, such state provisions have become “near[ly] universal.”241 
State and federal court interpretations of these statutes provide another 
means of determining the scope of officer protection beyond the literal text 
of the statutes. As noted above, state indemnification statutes routinely 
require that the tortfeasor employee acted within the scope of employment 
and not have engaged in intentional, reckless, or malicious wrongdoing. 
Therefore, in the absence of absolute immunity, it would seem that the 
extreme case—the prosecutor who intentionally suppresses exculpatory 
evidence—may not enjoy the protection of indemnity or qualified 
immunity. As a result, some argue that the indemnification provisions do 
not actually protect prosecutors. Since many of the statutes mirror the 
 
235  For example, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825 (West 1995 & Supp. 2012) provides for defense and 
indemnification for employees of any “public entity.” See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6109. More 
commonly, state and local employees are treated separately, and coverage may or may not be equal in 
scope. See SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 230 n.26; see, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17 (state employees); 
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 50-a to -k (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2012) (municipal employees). 
236  One example is Louisiana, which provides for legal defense and indemnification of state 
employees but does not appear to have a similar provision that protects local or municipal employees. 
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 13:5108.1 (2006) (stating that “covered individual” does not include “[a]n 
official, officer, or employee of a municipality, ward, parish, special district, including without 
limitation a levee district, school board, parish law enforcement district, or any other political 
subdivision or local authority”). Similarly, Missouri has a tort defense fund for limited groups of state 
employees, but does not appear to provide indemnification or insurance coverage for prosecutors. See 
MO. REV. STAT § 537.165 (2008) (creating a duty to defend tort actions against firemen improperly 
using motor vehicles but not providing indemnification). 
237  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-165 (West 2007). 
238  See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 824 (West 1995 & Supp. 2012). 
239  Compare CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825 (applying to any “employee or former employee of a public 
entity”), with N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 50-a to -k (treating separately claims against police, corrections 
officers, and “employees of the city of New York,” etc.). 
240  SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 86; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-621 (2004 & Supp. 2011). 
241  Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prosecutor: 
Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 63 (2005) (noting 
“the near universal scheme of state indemnification for government agents sued under section 1983”). 
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standards articulated in the Court’s immunity jurisprudence, some theorize 
that they would not protect prosecutors in the absence of absolute 
immunity.242 In response, others argue that the “plainly incompetent or those 
who knowingly violate the law” do not deserve protection from personal 
liability.243 Setting any normative judgments aside, case law indicates that 
indemnity protections may be significantly broader than facial readings of 
statutory text would indicate. 
Whether a state officer or employee is protected from § 1983 liability 
by a state indemnification statute and how far that protection extends are 
solely matters of state law, requiring a judicial interpretation of a particular 
indemnification statute.244 Many of these statutes have been written and 
interpreted by the state courts to be limited to cases not involving 
“conscious wrongdoing,” although some offer “virtually unlimited 
indemnification.”245 Harkening back to the language in Pierson, Tenney, and 
Imbler, virtually all of these statutes offer protection only for acts that are 
“within the scope of employment.”246 
However, some courts have been willing to interpret the phrase “within 
the scope of employment” in a way that could serve two seemingly 
inapposite goals. The statutes could both protect prosecutors from ultimate 
liability in a fashion similar to absolute immunity while simultaneously 
providing injured parties with the possibility of financial compensation that 
would have been denied under an immunity regime. For example, the 
Seventh Circuit has construed Illinois and Wisconsin state indemnification 
statutes to indicate that an employee may act within the scope of her 
employment even if she acts maliciously and to further her own objectives 
and injure the plaintiff.247 
 
242  See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 
1067–68 (5th ed. 1984) (providing examples of statutes that mirror the Court’s language). 
243  See Johns, Reconsidering, supra note 4, at 84–85. 
244  See, e.g., Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.3d 842, 845 n.1, 846–48 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
there is no federal indemnification statute and analyzing the state statute), overruled on other grounds by 
Acri v. Varian Assocs., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997); Hassan v. Fraccola, 851 F.2d 602, 604–05 
(2d Cir. 1988) (analyzing state statute). Section 1983 does not provide an independent cause of action 
for indemnification. Banks v. City of Emeryville, 109 F.R.D. 535, 539 (N.D. Cal. 1985); see, e.g., 
Holman v. Walls, 648 F. Supp. 947, 953 (D. Del. 1986). See generally 1B MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, 
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 16.17[B], at 16-278 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing 
these and other cases). 
245  KEETON ET AL., supra note 242, at 1068. 
246  SCHWARTZ, supra note 221, at 1217; see also Jeffries, supra note 208, at 50 & n.16. 
247  See Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142, 1149–50 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that mayor and police 
chief were entitled to indemnification under Illinois law because “subjective intent . . . was not the 
determining factor in deciding whether their actions were within the scope of their duty”); Hibma v. 
Odegaard, 769 F.2d 1147, 1152–53 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that acts closely related to the employee’s 
duties were within the scope of employment even if the methods the employee utilized were improper); 
see also 1B SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 16-279. 
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In Graham v. Sauk Prairie Police Commission, the Seventh Circuit 
found that the only requirement needed to satisfy Wisconsin’s 
indemnification statute was that the employee’s conduct be reasonably 
connected to his employment duties.248 Therefore, the police officer’s use of 
deadly force was within the scope of his employment even though he 
misused his official authority.249 The District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois rendered a similarly forgiving interpretation that protects the 
employee so long as the conduct has some rational relationship to the 
employee’s duties.250 These protected actions can be paralleled to a 
prosecutor who recklessly abuses his official prosecutorial authority and 
suppresses evidence. Therefore, regardless of normative judgments about 
whether “the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” 
deserve immunity protection, some courts have been willing to extend to 
them the shield of indemnification. 
These types of interpretations are, in essence, consistent with what 
Imbler and other decisions affirming absolute immunity have held. Though 
Graham involved police officers that received only qualified immunity, the 
conduct of the tortfeasors is analogous to the prosecutorial conduct that was 
protected by absolute immunity in Imbler, al-Kidd, and, potentially, 
Pottawattamie. Under a regime of absolute immunity, an individual would 
have no cause of action against a prosecutor that willfully suppressed 
exculpatory evidence to further her own case while at trial.251 However, 
under a qualified indemnity regime consistent with Graham and similar 
federal court decisions, a lack of absolute immunity, coupled with the 
interpretations of indemnity already applied by state and federal courts, 
would provide for a cause of action under § 1983 against a prosecutor who 
acts intentionally with the possibility of financial redress that does not come 
out of the prosecutor’s pocket. As a result, more expansive interpretations 
of what it means to commit an action “within the scope of employment” 
may indicate that absolute immunity is no longer necessary to protect a 
prosecutor that commits even the most egregious violations. 
C. Examples of State and Federal Expansion of Alternative Protections in 
Response to Shifts in Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
If the Supreme Court were to curtail or eliminate absolute immunity, 
legislatures would likely move to expand indemnification, insurance, and 
other protections to fill the void. A number of historical examples show that 
 
248  915 F.2d 1085, 1095–96 (7th Cir. 1990). 
249  Id. at 1095. 
250  See Lyons v. Adams, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1139 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (observing that under Illinois 
law, “conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is 
employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is 
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master”). 
251  See supra Part I.A. 
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in situations where states have not yet moved to protect their prosecutors 
through indemnification, a movement by the Supreme Court toward a 
primarily qualified immunity regime would likely result in such a 
development. 
One analogous situation is the development of indemnification for 
public defenders. State courts are split on the issue of whether public 
defenders should be immune from malpractice suits.252 The courts that have 
extended immunity to public defenders have analogized their role to that of 
judges and prosecutors, using many of the policy justifications and 
historical analogies set forth in Pierson, Tenney, and Imbler.253 However, 
despite the similarities between public defenders and their prosecutor 
counterparts, other states have not extended immunity to these government 
employees.254 In these situations, state legislatures have created other 
protections to defend these officials from ultimate liability for malpractice, 
namely insurance and indemnification. For example, in California, 
Connecticut, Ohio, and Illinois, legislatures have stipulated that in lieu of a 
judicially created immunity regime, indemnification will protect public 
defenders from ultimate financial liability arising out of malpractice suits.255 
The California case of Briggs v. Lawrence256 provides an example of 
how such a system operates. In that case, the plaintiff attempted to file a 
 
252  Some state courts have held that public defenders are entitled to immunity. See, e.g., Wright v. 
Elston, 701 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (public defender entitled to immunity under Indiana 
Tort Claims Act); Kuehne v. Hogan, 321 S.W.3d 337, 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (Ellis, J., concurring) 
(noting case could have been decided on other grounds because public defenders enjoy official 
immunity); Mooney v. Frazier, 693 S.E.2d 333, 344 (W. Va. 2010) (reaffirming immunity for public 
defenders). Other courts have held that public defenders are not entitled to any immunity whatsoever. 
See, e.g., Briggs v. Lawrence, 281 Cal. Rptr. 578, 581 (Ct. App. 1991) (“[D]efendants do not and cannot 
assert that as public defenders they would be individually immune from liability for malpractice.”); 
Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 740 (Pa. 1979) (public defenders “do not serve as public 
administrators with policy-making functions” and therefore under state law do not receive immunity); 
see also David J. Richards, Note, The Public Defender Defendant: A Model Statutory Approach to 
Public Defender Malpractice Liability, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 511, 513–14 (1994). 
253  See Richards, supra note 252, at 514; see also Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 
1993); Kuehne, 321 S.W.3d at 348 (Ellis, J., concurring). 
254  See Richards, supra note 252, at 513–14; see, e.g., Briggs, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 581; Reese, 406 
A.2d at 740. 
255  55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-1003 (West 2005) provides that:  
If any injury to the person or property of another is caused by a public defender or any assistant 
public defender, while the public defender or assistant public defender is engaged in the 
performance of his duties as such, the county shall indemnify the public defender or assistant 
public defender, as the case may be, for any judgment recovered against him as the result of that 
injury, except where the injury results from the willful misconduct of the public defender or 
assistant public defender, as the case may be. 
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-141d(a) (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 120.41 (West 2002); 
see also Briggs, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 582 (stating in malpractice suit against public defender that defendant 
may be entitled to indemnification under CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 825-825.6); Richards, supra note 252, at 
555–56 (describing model statute for indemnification of public defenders). 
256  Briggs, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 579. 
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common law malpractice suit against two Monterey County public 
defenders without first going through the state’s statutorily created 
procedure for claims against public employees.257 Though the California 
appellate court noted that the public defenders were not immune from suit, 
it nevertheless affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim on summary 
judgment.258 The court held that the state’s statutory scheme addressing tort 
suits against public employees, which includes public defenders, requires a 
plaintiff to first pursue an administrative claim against the employing public 
agency, which in this case was Monterey County.259 The agency would then 
investigate the claim, and if the public defender’s actions fell within the 
conduct protected by the state’s indemnification statute, would defend the 
employee in the course of any legal proceeding and indemnify her against 
any losses incurred in the course of litigation.260 This is just one example of 
how states like California, Connecticut, Ohio, and Illinois would likely 
expand alternative protections for prosecutors in the event absolute 
immunity were not available due to a shift in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
The government’s response to the expansion of potential liability for 
federal officials under Bivens261 provides another important historical 
analogue. In the early 1980s, federal employees who were sued for actions 
within the scope of their employment had no legal entitlement to 
government representation.262 The United States generally defended them at 
the public’s expense provided that the government believed the acts in 
question were within the scope of federal employment.263 Federal law did 
not provide for the purchase of insurance against the personal liability of its 
prosecutors.264 
Regarding indemnification, no general federal statutory authority 
existed for indemnifying federal employees, even for conduct that was 
clearly within the scope of their employment.265 Since claims against federal 
officials for constitutional torts can be brought against the United States 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act,266 the government relied on the 
 
257  Id. at 579–80. 
258  Id. at 580. 
259  Id. at 586. 
260  Id. at 582. 
261  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390–97 
(1971) (establishing a cause of action for individuals to sue federal government employees for 
constitutional torts). 
262  SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 83. 
263  Id. at 84. 
264  See Michael W. Dolan, Constitutional Torts and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 14 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 281, 296 (1980). 
265  See George A. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1175, 1191 (1977); Dolan, supra note 264. 
266  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
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unattractiveness of suing an individual official as compared to the allure of 
suing a “deep-pocketed” defendant like the government to divert many 
suits.267 Despite these diversionary protections, individual federal officials 
were still highly vulnerable to suit. The Justice Department’s official stance 
was that “[i]f an employee suffers an adverse judgment, with very few 
exceptions, it is he or she who must pay it.”268 
The post-Bivens world looks very different. As Bivens has given rise to 
a significant increase in constitutional tort litigation against federal 
employees over the past few decades,269 the federal government has 
enhanced protections to shield their employees from ultimate liability. In a 
situation where a Bivens claim results in individual monetary liability, the 
federal government now indemnifies its employees against constitutional 
tort judgments or settlements.270 Officials are now entitled to representation 
from Justice Department lawyers to defend against Bivens suits or have the 
option to hire private counsel with government funds.271 A number of 
specific agencies have also set aside appropriations in the event that their 
employees face ultimate financial liability arising from a Bivens suit.272 
Indemnification is not fully guaranteed up front; payment will be made only 
if the challenged conduct was within the scope of employment and 
indemnification is in the interest of the United States.273 As a practical 
matter, however, indemnification is a “virtual certainty.”274 
 
267  See id.; §§ 2671–80 (including no motion of individual liability). 
268  Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agency Admin. of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 160 (1981) (statement of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice). 
269  See supra Part I.A. 
270  28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c) (2011); see generally Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The 
Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 76–78 (1999) 
(discussing the protections against individual liability for Bivens suits Congress has created). 
271  § 50.15(a). The federal government provides representation in about 98% of the cases for which 
representation is requested. See Pillard, supra note 270, at 76 n.51 (citing Memorandum for Heads of 
Dep’t Components from Stephen R. Colgate, Assistant Att’y Gen. for Admin. (June 15, 1998)). 
272  See § 50.15(c) (Department of Justice indemnification provisions related to employees); see also 
13 C.F.R. § 114.110 (2011) (Small Business Administration); 14 C.F.R. § 1261.316 (2011) (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration); 17 C.F.R. §§ 142.1–.2 (2011) (Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission); 22 C.F.R. § 21.1 (2011) (Department of State); 31 C.F.R. § 3.30 (2011) (Treasury 
Department); 32 C.F.R. § 516.32 (2011) (Department of the Army and Department of Defense); 34 
C.F.R. §§ 60.1–.2 (2011) (Department of Education); 38 C.F.R. § 14.514(c) (2011) (Department of 
Veteran’s Affairs); 43 C.F.R. § 22.6 (2011) (Department of the Interior); 45 C.F.R. § 36.1 (2011) 
(Department of Health and Human Services). 
273  See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c); see also id. § 50.15(a)(8)(iii). 
274  Pillard, supra note 270, at 77. An example of a Bivens action in which a federal employee 
“would not be represented and indemnified by the government is one in which the employee is under 
criminal investigation or prosecution by the government for the conduct that gave rise to the 
constitutional tort suit. These cases are, however, extremely rare.” Id. at 77 n.56; see also id. at 76–78 & 
n.51 (noting that the federal government represented 98% of Bivens defendants who requested counsel). 
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The developments in Illinois to protect public defenders from § 1983 
liability and the response of Congress and the federal agencies to the 
establishment of Bivens suits reflect a predictable pattern: that of an 
employer responding to an increase in financial pressure on its employees 
by protecting the employees in order to, in turn, protect the “business.” 
Professors Fallon and Meltzer point out that the “genius” of the Bivens 
system of liability is that it exerted pressure on the government “to 
indemnify its officials and thereby convert what appeared to be a system of 
officers’ liability into, for some if not all practical purposes, a regime of 
governmental liability.”275 As Professor Pillard posits: 
If individuals are held personally liable for harms caused by their employment, 
they will pressure their employers to cover those costs—whether in the form of 
additional compensation, insurance, or indemnification. In order to attract 
employees and to ensure that they fulfill their duties, an employer, whether 
public or private, may feel compelled to shoulder the costs of employee 
liability.276 
This is exactly what has played out in both Illinois and in the federal 
government. 
These examples suggest that if the Court were to roll back absolute 
immunity for prosecutors, state legislatures and Congress would again 
respond in kind to protect their employees. During litigation of the Bivens 
case, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold noted his concern that in the early 
1970s there was no statutory authority or popular practice of reimbursing 
federal employees for judgments against them.277 The implication was that 
federal employees would be stuck paying judgments if the Court 
established a cause of action for damage suits against federal employees. 
His arguments mirror the Court’s fears, as articulated in the Imbler–Buckley 
line of cases, of chilling prosecutorial behavior.278 Forty years later, the 
federal government has responded to the specter of individual liability on its 
own. We should expect a similar development if the Court were to decide to 
roll back absolute prosecutorial immunity. 
 
275  Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1822 (1991). 
276  Pillard, supra note 270, at 76. 
277  Brief for Respondents at 28–30 & n.33, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (No. 70-301), 1970 WL 116900 (“There are no federal 
statutes or regulations authorizing reimbursement of judgments against federal law enforcement officers 
in these kinds of cases; and we know of no informal practice of doing so. Even if an informal practice 
did evolve, it is doubtful that funds would be available to cover awards as high as those sought in this 
case.”). 
278  See supra Part I.C for the Court’s rationales in support of absolute prosecutorial immunity. 
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III. CRITICISMS OF AN EXPANSIVE INSURANCE AND  
INDEMNIFICATION REGIME  
Though the expansion of indemnification to protect prosecutors in the 
absence of absolute immunity is a promising alternative, it would create 
some financial, practical, and political costs. The first major criticism of an 
expansive insurance and indemnification regime, and the one that has been 
paramount in the Supreme Court’s decisions to uphold the Imbler and 
Buckley line of cases, is that it would insufficiently protect prosecutors in 
the “vigorous and fearless” exercise of their duties.279 As Professor Schuck 
argues, if the denial of protections like insurance and indemnification 
“could be surgically limited to truly malicious officials held liable under 
§ 1983 . . . wrongdoing could be deterred with little or no cost to vigorous 
decisionmaking.”280 However, where “bad faith is not restricted to actual 
malice” and may be based upon “a decidedly amorphous judicial standard” 
under which officials may bear the burden of proof, “the threat to vigorous 
decisionmaking may be great.”281 
Schuck also argues that insurance contracts and indemnification laws 
would, unless proscribed by statute, inevitably contain certain limitations on 
coverage.282 Similar to the “good faith” test utilized under qualified 
immunity, these nonstatutory provisions create new boundary problems and 
uncertainties about coverage.283 In sum, Schuck posits that “[t]hese 
gaps . . . resurrect the very incentives for official self-protection that these 
reforms are designed to obviate.”284 
However, much has changed since Schuck published his seminal work 
in 1983. Almost all of the indemnification laws in place are, in fact, 
proscribed by statute, creating a floor for protection and obviating the 
concern that many of these provisions would be left open to the vagaries of 
judicial interpretation.285 Furthermore, the judicial interpretations of 
statutory indemnification language indicate that courts are most often 
willing to interpret any vagaries in language in favor of providing 
indemnification.286 Looking to the federal Bivens indemnification model, as 
reimbursement alternatives have become more available they have also 
become significantly more uniform. Inconsistency is now a more minor 
concern.287 
 
279  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–28 (1976). 
280  SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 87. 
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287  Pillard, supra note 270, at 78. 
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Another concern is that even if prosecutors are protected from ultimate 
financial liability, a cause of action under § 1983 brings with it all of the 
practical demands of being sued.288 However, “vengeful ex-defendants face 
greater obstacles today than in 1976,”289 and an ethical prosecutor need not 
fear a flood of civil rights actions.290 First, the current requirements for 
imposing liability are sufficiently rigorous to eliminate unfounded and 
harassing litigation.291 For example, Heck v. Humphrey mandates that 
certain causes of action under § 1983 cannot ripen until an individual is 
exonerated from the crime for which she was prosecuted.292 This eliminates 
a large swath of frivolous litigation that could be brought against a 
prosecutor in any indemnification regime. Second, qualified immunity has 
become a potent defense that minimizes litigation burdens and protects all 
but the “plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”293 
This extremely broad protection should not be underestimated. Third, courts 
have efficient tools for minimizing or penalizing unmeritorious litigation—
particularly the strict approach to pleading the Court embraced under Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and reaffirmed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.294 
On top of these protections, tougher habeas corpus rules also narrow 
the potential class of § 1983 plaintiffs. Just after deciding Imbler, the Court 
held that Fourth Amendment issues heard and fairly decided in state court 
could not be the subject of federal habeas corpus review.295 The following 
year, the Court barred the “deliberate bypass” of state courts to get to 
federal court, thereby reducing the ability of a prisoner to get a reversal.296 
These and other changes in habeas corpus law have led to a very small 
 
288  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424–25 (1976). 
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success rate for habeas petitions.297 The result of these reforms means that 
honest and ethical prosecutors need not fear vexatious litigation from 
former defendants. 
It is likely that an indemnification regime may require a great deal 
more resources, an increase in bureaucratic staffing, and an expansion of 
other unforeseen rules to handle an expanded liability regime. This is an 
obvious cost considering many of the causes of action that would be 
permitted under an insurance and indemnity regime would be dismissed at 
the pleading stage if absolute liability were in place. However, it is the 
contention of this Note that these added costs, to be spread across society, 
are statutorily mandated by § 1983, practicable, and worth providing for 
redress to individuals who otherwise would have no form of recompense for 
their injuries. 
A different type of criticism is based on a sense that broad-based 
indemnification goes too far in making prosecutors feel judgment proof. 
Some believe that the existence of an almost universal scheme of state 
indemnification for damage awards would defeat the deterrence potential of 
monetary awards and not have enough of an impact on prosecutor 
conduct.298 It is possible that a regime that protects prosecutors from 
ultimate financial liability would have a weaker deterrent effect than one in 
which indemnification does not exist.299 However, there are a number of 
other externalities, such as a stronger incentive to hide improper conduct, 
which would develop if prosecutors were to face ultimate liability.300 
Furthermore, the deterrence rationale will still be greater than under a 
regime of absolute immunity, where a prosecutor faces little if any negative 
repercussions for improper conduct.301 
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CONCLUSION 
In Burns v. Reed, the Court indicated that if a body of law were 
established that provided “ample” support to protect prosecutors from 
forces that would render them unable to execute their duties, it would be 
willing to scale back absolute immunity.302 This Note has provided 
examples that indicate that federal, state, and local legislation, practices, 
and judicial decisions continue to build protections that move the current 
legal regime closer to the ideal of providing sufficient extra-immunity 
protections for prosecutors. However, empirical analysis can only get us so 
far. As long as the absolute immunity doctrine remains in place, there will 
not be significant further development of indemnification for prosecutors as 
there is nothing to indemnify. As a result, the current scope of 
indemnification, insurance, and other protections may not yet be 
sufficiently consistent or reliable to convince the Court to abandon its 
unworkable absolute prosecutorial immunity standard completely. 
However, state insurance and indemnification schemes are certainly more 
expansive than the Court has acknowledged. As these protections continue 
to expand, hopefully American law will continue to move toward the 
Aristotelian ideal of a legal system that does not focus on “whether a good 
man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one,” but rather “looks 
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